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I. ARREST
A. Misdemeanors
A police officer is not authorized to break open a door in a
private dwelling in order to make an arrest without a warrant for a
misdemeanor even where the officer observes the violation and is in
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hot pursuit.' The court stated that the exceptions to the Florida
statute' which governs when an officer may break into a building
listed in Benefield v. State' do not apply to the warrantless arrest
of a misdemeanant.
B. Authority to Arrest
During the survey period a municipal police officer's authority
to arrest was extended to interstate highways within the boundaries
of municipalities.4 The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that pursuant to Florida Statutes section 316.016(3)(a) (1973)
a municipal police officer is specifically authorized to enforce state
traffic laws on sections of interstate highways located within munic-
ipal boundaries and that such authority is not divested by Florida
Statutes section 316.006 (1973) which gives exclusive traffic control
jurisdiction over such highways to the state. This latter section,
according to the court, relates to fixing traffic control devices, speed
limits, signs and the like to insure uniformity. The former section
permits enforcement of such requirements by municipal officers.
C. Probable Cause to Arrest
In Gullo v. State' a police officer was held to have probable
cause to arrest, thus making admissible the fruits of a search inci-
dent to the arrest. The defendants were first observed at 2:00 A.M.
entering a restaurant with a reputation for drug traffic. They were
again observed at 5:00 A.M. pulling into a motel parking lot in the
company of a person locally known for criminal activity (of an un-
stated nature). That person, when observing the arresting officer,
became frightened, causing the officer to become suspicious. An-
other occupant of the car was absent. The officer inquired as to his
whereabouts and was told that he had "gotten scared" and left.
That person subsequently came from the back of the motel, looking
very shaken. When questioned, the defendants said they were look-
ing for a certain motel. The officer did not believe this because one
1. Rocker v. State, 302 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974)(involving a traffic violation and
disorderly conduct).
2. FLA. STAT. § 901.19 (1973).
3. 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964).
4. State v. Williams 303 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), case dismissed, 314 So. 2d 591
(Fla. 1975).
5. 280 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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of the group was known to be from the area. The officer stated that
upon consideration of these facts he believed that defendant and his
friends were in the process of robbing the motel and arrested them
for disorderly conduct. The court held that the arrest was one which
could have been made by any officer confronted with these facts.
The court further held that the discovery of a marijuana seed on the
seat of the car prior to the arrest did not change the facts, and that
the police had a right to inventory the car.
II. CONFESSIONS
A. Voluntariness of Confessions
The United States Supreme Court held, in Lego v. Twomey,'
that the prosecution has the burden of proving, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that a confession was voluntarily given. While not-
ing that prior Florida decisions had required a higher standard of
proof' the Supreme Court of Florida adopted this standard in
McDole v. State.' There, three men, including McDole, were
charged with rape. All three subsequently confessed. In spite of
considerable evidence that the confessions were obtained by beat-
ings and coercion, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress, but
allowed evidence on the issue of voluntariness to be presented to the
jury for their consideration. The jury convicted the defendants. The
Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that the trial judge
erred in failing to make a specific finding of voluntariness supported
by a preponderance of the evidence. The court further found that
the evidence would not have supported such a finding.
McDole was distinguished in Wilson v. State9 where the trial
judge had not made a specific finding of voluntariness, but had
simply denied the motion to suppress. The court concluded that the
judge must have correctly determined that the confession was vol-
untary where the uncontroverted evidence indicated a total absence
of coercion. This implies that no detailed finding of voluntariness
is required in such a case.
In determining the voluntariness of a defendant's confession,
6. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
7. E.g., Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969), where the court required that
allegations supporting a motion to suppress be negatived by "clear and convincing evidence."
8. 283 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1973).
9. 304 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1974).
[Vol. 30:635
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the factors the trial judge must consider are whether it was freely
and voluntarily given without fear, hope of reward, or promise of
escaping punishment.'" Furthermore, the totality of the circumstan-
ces must be considered." In State v. Chorpenning,"2 the defendant,
who had a history of mental illness and only a 7th grade education,
was coerced by a police officer into confessing to a murder. The
officer first told the defendant that charges would not be pressed in
an unrelated matter if he admitted committing the crime. Defen-
dant did so after being given the facts of the crime through leading
questions. The officer then told the defendant that he also wished
to clear up the instant case. The defendant was led to believe that
he would be allowed to return home if he confessed, and was also
threatened with the loss of his foster child. Again, he was given the
facts of the crime through leading questions. The court held, after
considering the totality of the circumstances, that the confessions
were not freely made and must be suppressed.
Failure to provide a hearing to determine the validity of a con-
fession was held to be harmless error in McDonnell v. State," be-
cause of "other overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's
guilt." 4 However, in Land v. State," refusal to grant a defendant
an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury to enable
him to testify concerning the voluntariness of his confession was
held to be reversible error. The trial court recognized its error after
defendant was convicted, and while refusing to grant a new trial,
had attempted to rectify its error by granting a post-trial eviden-
tiary hearing. The supreme court distinguished Fowler v. State"
10. See Williams v. State, 143 Fla. 826, 197 So. 562 (1940).
11. See Demattia v. State, 292 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Williams v. State, 156
Fla. 300, 22 So. 2d 821 (1945).
12. 294 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
13. 292 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
14. Id. at 421.
15. 293 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1974).
16. 255 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1971). The court below relied on Fowler to justify the post trial
hearing. There, the evidentiary hearing addressed itself to the issue of sanity. The supreme
court, in the instant case, cited the dissent of Judge Johnson in the lower court who distin-
guished Fowler by observing that a failure to afford a plenary hearing for trial on the issue of
competence is not such as would necessarily affect the choice of evidentiary considerations
to be subsequently presented to a jury while the trial court's disposition of the voluntariness
issue would dictate to a considerable extent subsequent defense trial strategy, including
evidentiary considerations to be presented to the jury.
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and Swenson v. Stidham7 in holding that Jackson v. Denno5 re-
quired a pre-trial hearing on the voluntariness of the confession.
B. Miranda Warnings
The importance of giving the Miranda" warnings before inter-
rogation was reviewed in Walls v. State" and Rodriquez v. State."'
In Walls, a police officer questioned a jailed suspect without giving
the required warnings. The suspect, when asked if he robbed the
victim, nodded his head in an affirmative manner. The court held
that the testimony of the officer was admissible only to impeach the
defendant, who, while on the stand, denied telling anyone that he
had robbed the victim. The court recognized, however, that the
evidence would not have been admissible as part of the State's case
in chief. In Rodriquez, the defendant was a poorly educated
Spanish-speaking person. The police officer testified that he
thought he gave the Miranda warnings in Spanish and also that the
defendant "smelled of alcohol." He further testified that he asked
defendant if he would talk without a lawyer. The court, reviewing
all of the circumstances, felt that the State did not meet "its heavy
burden to establish that the appellant was clearly informed of his
right to counsel and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his
right thereto. '22
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, dealing with a
similar issue, held that the defendant's confession was not voluntary
even though he signed a statement that he was given the Miranda
warnings." The defendant had been read the warnings but gave no
acknowledgement that he understood them. He was asked to sign
the warning, and did sign without being told the effect of his signa-
17. 409 U.S. 224 (1972).
18. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). There the Court held:
It is both practical and desirable that in cases to be tried hereafter a proper
determination of voluntariness be made prior to the admission of the confession
to the jury which is adjudicating guilt or innocence. Id. at 395.
19. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda warnings are as follows:
You have a right to remain silent. Anything that you say will be admissible
against you in court. You have a right to an attorney during this questioning. If
you cannot afford an attorney one will will be provided for you free of charge.
20. 279 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
21. 287 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973), cert. dismissed, 293 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1974).
22. Id. at 396-97. For the state's burden in a pre.Miranda arrest with a post-Miranda
trial see State v. Statewright, 300 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1974).
23. Ware v. State, 307 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 316 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1975).
[Vol. 30:635
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ture. During the interrogation that followed, the officer used the
"family approach," indicating to defendant that he would spend
less time away from his family if he was cooperative. The court,
considering the totality of the circumstances, held that the state
failed to show the confession was freely and voluntarily given.
C. Other Confession Issues
When police officers sitting in another room, inadvertently ov-
erhear a suspect make an inculpatory statement, such a confession
is admissible into evidence. The facts of Taylor v. State4 showed
that the two officers overheard the defendant's statement while he
was in another room speaking to his wife. The defendant had pre-
viously been advised of his Miranda rights. He contended that his
alleged admission was wilfully intercepted in violation of chapter
934 of the Florida Statutes (1973). The court dismissed this argu-
ment, since an "interception" was defined under section 934.02 of
the Florida Statutes as an "aural acquisition of the contents of any
wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, me-
chanical, or other device." Since there was nothing in the record to
show that any device was used in the overhearing, the court held
that the overhearing did not fall within the quoted section.
In Adams v. State," defendants were improperly charged with
loitering and contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Within 45
minutes they were charged with robbery, the offense the officers had
in mind when the arrest was made. Defendants sought to suppress
statements made after their arrest, but the statements were admit-
ted into evidence and defendants were convicted. The District Court
of Appeal, Second District, affirmed. The court indicated that while
tangible evidence seized as a result of a sham arrest would be sup-
pressible, the defendants were charged almost immediately with the
proper crime; and that the police had probable cause to make the
arrest. The court further indicated that while its scope is presently
unclear, the Wong Sun doctrine"6 would not bar reception of a volun-
24. 292 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 298 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1974).
25. 295 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1974).
26. The Wong Sun Doctrine, originating in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963), indicates that verbal evidence which is immediately derived from unlawful entry and
an unauthorized arrest is the "fruit" of official illegality, and is inadmissible unless obtained
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
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tary confession made after full explanation of the suspect's constitu-
tional rights.
In State v. Applebaum,27 the defendant made certain state-
ments to the State's witness, an informant, after the filing of the
information but prior to his arrest. The trial court suppressed these
statements and the State took an interlocutory appeal. Relying on
Parnell v. State,"5 the court held the statements admissible as being
voluntarily made before defendant had been notified of the proceed-
ings against him.
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Search Warrants
The Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. Wolff," interpreted
section 933.18 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974) which lists the
prerequisites for issuance of a warrant to search a private dwelling.
The statute's "credible witness" requirement had been restricted by
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, to one who himself
knows the facts; thus effectively prohibiting the use of hearsay in
issuing the warrant. The Supreme Court of Florida held that this
interpretation was not intended by the legislature nor mandated by
the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas" or Spinelli
v. United States." The court then presented rules for the evaluation
of the information contained in the affidavit. The magistrate must
evaluate: (1) the integrity and truthfulness of the witness before
him; (2) the reliability of the source of the information given by the
witness; and (3) the adequacy of the factual premises furnished
from all sources to support the validity of the conclusion.2
27. 296 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1974).
28. 218 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
29. 310 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1975).
30. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
31. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
32. In Hicks v. State, 299 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 739 (Fla.
1975), an affidavit for a search warrant was held to be within the Aguilar and Spinelli tests
even though the information was obtained by an allegedly improper admission given by
defendants. The defendants claimed that the affidavit did not specifically set out that they
had received their rights. The court held that if the information was improperly obtained,
procedures other than attacking a search warrant were available. "To say that the affidavit
itself is defective for alleging appropriate warnings in a general way is to quibble, contrary to
the common sense of the situation." Id. at 46. See also State v. Middleton, 302 So. 2d 144
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), where it was held that an affidavit for issuance of a residential search
warrant need not recite circumstances of affiant's own personal knowledge supportive of
[Vol. 30:635
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The allowable scope of a search under a warrant was dealt with
in Dunn v. State,33 Joyner v. State,34 and Cleveland v. State." In
Dunn,.the court suppressed evidence obtained from an automobile
which was parked in the driveway of the house described in the
warrant. The court observed that the warrant only described the
premises and did not include the phrase "the curtilage thereof."
However, a search of an automobile in a parking lot was upheld in
Joyner where the warrant included the requisite phrase, notwith-
standing the fact that the automobile was in the parking lot of a
multi-unit dwelling. The court considered the parking lot part of the
curtilage and found that the automobile was sufficiently identi-
fiably by the use of keys found in the apartment. 6 The issue in
Cleveland concerned not the area searched, but the evidence
sought. The police, armed with a valid warrant specifying gambling
paraphernalia, discovered blank driver's licenses. The court, citing
Partin v. State,3" found the search lawful and continuous and the
fruits thereof were admissible.
Pursuant to section 933.09 of the Florida Statutes (1973), an
officer may break open the door of a house to execute a search
warrant only after he has given due notice of his authority and
purpose and has been refused admittance. An exception exists
where the officer is justified in believing that persons within the
house are attempting to destroy evidence. This exception was recog-
nized in Whisnant v. State,3" where the officer, armed with a search
warrant for gambling paraphernalia, knocked and loudly announced
his authority and purpose. While waiting for a response, he heard
people running and furniture being moved. The officer then broke
issuance of the warrant other than information received from a confidential informant; State
v. Compton, 301 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), where the concurring opinion of Judge Mann
sets out the penalty for a confidential informant who lies. Judge Mann noticed that the
confidential informant's name does not have to be given but, if his statements are found to
be untrue, he is vulnerable to perjury action.
33. 292 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. dismissed, 296 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1974).
34. 303 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
35. 287 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
36. In Dunn the searching officers did not know to whom the vehicle belonged.
37. 277 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 283 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1973). In Partin the
court held
that a law enforcement officer conducting a search under a valid search warrant
• . . may lawfully seize property not specifically described in the warrant if he
has probable cause to believe it to be stolen property. Id. at 848.
38. 303 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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down the door and seized the equipment. The court upheld the
seizure, finding that the officer was justified in believing that evi-
dence was being destroyed, and therefore was not required to wait
until he was refused admittance.
Normally, a search warrant specifies the description of the
premises to be searched and the property to be seized over the
signature of the granting magistrate. The warrant in Booze v.
State,39 however, was not made out in this form. The requisite infor-
mation was given in affidavits which were attached to the warrant
and incorporated by reference on the face of the warrant. The court,
in allowing the search warrant to stand, reasoned that prior deci-
sions have permitted an affidavit to cure a defective search warrant
where the two are physically connected, and where the search war-
rant expressly refers to the affidavit and incorporates it by refer-
ence.' The court noted the importance of the requirement that the
affidavit be attached to the warrant. "[Ilt avoids any possible
claim or suspicion by the citizen involved that the affidavit later
located in the official file was inserted after the fact . . . . I' This
reasoning ignores the fact that the person whose home is to be
searched may not, and probably would not, read the warrant care-
fully when initially confronted with it. Since the warrant and any
evidence seized in the search would be returned to the issuing mag-
istrate, the supporting affidavits could easily be changed after the
fact should an unscrupulous police officer deem it necessary. While
the court suggests that the extra pages be initialled or signed, it
would be far better to require a small amount of extra typing in
order to insure the continuity of the documents.
B. Warrantless Searches
1. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
The "plain view" doctrine allows an officer to seize contraband,
stolen property, or evidence of a crime without a warrant. This
exception to the warrant requirement attaches when the property in
question is within the line of sight of the officer and his presence in
the area is lawful.4 2
39. 291 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974).
40. Id. at 263, quoting Bloom v. State 283 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
41. Id. at 263, citing Moore v. United States, 461 F.2d 1236, 1239 (D.C.Cir. 1972).




In Castle v. State,43 the officer in question was a local firechief.
In the course of his duties he discovered evidence of arson, which
he and the Deputy State Fire Marshall removed. Defendant moved
to suppress the evidence seized in this manner. The court held that
the officials were on the scene lawfully, and that the evidence (can-
dles, paper, bags of gasoline) was seized for public safety reasons.
However, the court further indicated that even if the items were not
seized for safety reasons, they were in plain view and could have
been seized.
Where a defendant invited government investigators into his
trailer and one saw what appeared to be bags of marijuana, the
investigator was able to seize the supposed contraband without a
warrant.44 The court indicated that there was no search, and held
that the presence of the investigators, and seizure of the bags in
plain view was lawful. The dissenting judge, however, would have
suppressed the evidence.4" The facts, as he relates them, do not
clearly support the majority's findings that the plain view doctrine
was appropriate. Judge McCord said the record showed that only
the plastic bags were visible and the investigator actually had to
remove them from the trash to ascertain that they contained mari-
juana. He further stated that plastic bags in and of themselves have
no per se nexus to criminal activity, and that without a warrant the
search was illegal.4"
A difficult issue concerning the plain view doctrine was
broached by McDaniel v. State.47 Defendant's brother contacted the
police and informed them that the defendant had marijuana. He
offered to let the police inside his brother's residence, and, in order
to induce the police to enter, represented that he had the right of
access to the house. He met the police at the home and broke a
window to gain access. At this point, without entering, the police
saw marijuana plants in the living room. Defendant claimed his
brother had no right to enter and that the entry and seizure of
evidence were unlawful. The state contended that the brother oper-
ated as a private person, not an agent of the police and that the
plain view doctrine applied. The court agreed. The dissenting judge
43. 305 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1975).
44. State v. Kauflin, 294 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
45. Id. at 8 (McCord, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 10.
47. 301 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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would have suppressed the evidence, stating that defendant's
brother's representation that he was responsible for the house did
not legitimize the breaking, and that the marijuana did not come
into view until the illegal act was complete, making the plain view
doctrine inapplicable." The result of the majority holding-that a
private person can assist the police in a manner such as this-
ignores the trespassory aspect of the police presence as well as the
obvious illegality of the brother's action.
An interesting case involving the plain view doctrine was State
v. Day.49 A police officer, while examining a parked car, noticed the
butt of a pistol protruding from under the seat. The defendant was
arrested for carrying a concealed weapon and was searched incident
to this arrest. The defendant brought an interlocutory appeal to
suppress the weapon and contraband found on his person. The court
found that the arrest was improper since a concealed weapon must
be completely concealed, and that it is impossible to arrest for
carrying a concealed weapon and at the same time seize that
weapon on the basis that it is in plain view. The court suppressed
the evidence.
2. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AND INVESTIGATIVE STOP
The issues of probable cause to arrest and reasonable suspicion
to stop and frisk are intertwined with search and seizure problems.
Police may, incident to a lawful arrest, make a full search of the
person5 and the area within his immediate control.' Furthermore,
more constricted searches of the person are permitted, under limited
circumstances, without probable cause to arrest.52 The relationships
between lawful arrest and search and seizure, and between stop and
frisk and search and seizure are examined in the following cases.
In State v. Brooks,5" the trial court suppressed a .22 caliber
pistol, found on defendant's person, as the fruit of an unconstitu-
tional search. Police patrolling a high crime district at 4:00 A.M.
heard a gunshot. Turning the corner they observed two black males
sitting on steps in front of a home. In response to the officers quest
48. 301 So. 2d at 142 (Rawls, C.J., dissenting).
49. 301 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1975).
50. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
51. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
52. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
53. 281 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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tioning, defendant said they had been there a while, but heard
nothing like a shot. The officer then frisked the men and found a
pistol. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed,
holding that considering the totality of the circumstances the frisk-
ing was justified and comported with cases construing Florida's stop
and frisk law,54 and with Terry v. Ohio. It would seem that the court
could have as easily reached a contrary result.
A different result was reached in Cotellis v. State."' Here var-
ious circumstances led the officer to be suspicious that defendant
had stolen an automobile. He conducted a pat down search and
retrieved a trunk key. He opened the trunk, saw a long box, which
he opened, and found several pounds of marijuana. The court held
the search invalid. The officer had the right to make a pat down
search, but only for weapons. When he felt the key he had no author-
ity to require defendant to produce it. As he lacked the necessary
probable cause to search, and had not arrested defendant, the
search was invalid.
In Bailey v. State,"5 defendant was a passenger in a car stopped
for a traffic violation. After speaking with the driver the officer did
54. FLA. STAT. § 901.151 (1973). The stop and frisk law enables a law enforcement officer
to detain persons to ascertain their identity and the circumstances of their presence under
circumstances reasonably indicating that the person has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a violation of a criminal law or ordinance. FLA. STAT. § 901.151 (2). Further-
more, when an officer is authorized to detain a suspect under subsection (2), and has probable
cause to believe he is armed with a dangerous weapon, he may search the person to the extent
necessary to disclose, and for the purpose of disclosing, such weapon. If a weapon is found it
may be seized. FLA. STAT. § 901.151(5).
While the stop and frisk law was intended to reiterate the circumstances under which
an officer may detain a suspected law violator as enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, (see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 901.151 Historical Note) the statutory language appears to be more restrictive than
Terry with regard to when an officer may search a suspect. The statute requires probable
cause to believe the suspect is armed with a dangerous weapon, and therefore a threat to the
safety of the officer or others before conducting a search. Terry, on the other hand, held that
where an officer observes conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude that criminal
activity may be afoot, and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
dangerous, he may conduct the prescribed limited search. It is arguable that the Florida
Statute requires more than Terry. In Perry v. State, 296 So. 2d. 505 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), the
court held that § 901.151 required that after an officer has detained a suspect, he must have
probable cause to believe he is armed and dangerous before conducting a search. Compare
Thomas v. State, 250 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), where the court, while finding probable
cause, indicated that Terry made clear that the search involved was authorized by the Florida
Statute.
55. 297 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
56. 295 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), quashed on other grounds, 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla.
1975).
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not make an arrest as "everything checked out." However, he did
decide to check the identification of the two passengers. While doing
this, he observed a plastic bag beneath defendant's leg. He reached
in, took the bag, and found ashes with a strong odor of marijuana.
He then arrested all three persons. The court held the search unrea-
sonable stating, inter alia, that it was not incident to a lawful arrest
inasmuch as no arrest had been made for the traffic violation.
The same issue was addressed in D.L.C. v. State.7 An officer
stopped defendant as he appeared to be violating a curfew for per-
sons under age 16. After ascertaining that defendant was only 15,
and had been drinking, the officer instructed defendant to empty
his pockets. After defendant said he had done so, the officer noticed
a bulge in defendant's pocket and pulled out a bag of marijuana.
The court held the search lawful as incident to a valid arrest, al-
though the defendant had not been told he was under arrest. The
officer stated it was his policy not to say to a juvenile "you are under
arrest" because it gets them "shaken up." 8
The cases above illustrate that a search made incident to a
lawful arrest is valid. However, if the arrest is made solely to legiti-
matize a search, the search is not valid. 9 In Harding v. State, 0 state
officers, acting on a tip, decided to serve two city traffic arrest
warrants on a friend of the defendant in the defendant's home. The
officers' reason was that since the friend was a well known member
of the "local drug scene," it was likely that there would be drugs
there. During the arrest, defendant, who had been out of the room,
re-entered carrying a bag of marijuana. He was then arrested. The
court found the original arrest on the traffic warrants to be a pretext
arrest and therefore the plain sight seizure from the defendant was
held unreasonable. The court noted, however, that it did not suggest
that the arrest was illegal in the strictest sense. The court limited
its holding to be, that conceding the strict legality of the arrest,
under the circumstances the seizure from defendant was unreason-
able."
A defendant's arrest was also held to be a pretext in Shaffer v.
State. 2 Defendant was intoxicated and asleep in the guest room of
57. 298 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
58. Id. at 481, (McCord, J., concurring specially).
59. See Prather v. State, 182 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
60. 301 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1975).
61. Id. at 515.
62. 295 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1974).
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a private dwelling. A police officer gained lawful admittance and
started to question the defendant. After receiving incorrect informa-
tion (a false name), he arrested the defendant for drunkenness and
took him to the police station. He was subsequently searched and a
sum of money, slightly less than an amount stolen from his place of
employment, was found. The court held that the arrest was patently
a pretext, and held the search invalid.
Similarly, the impounding of a car on a pretext can lead to
suppression of evidence subsequently seized. In State v. Volk,"3 the
court analogized the needless impounding of a car to make an inven-
tory search to a pretext arrest. There, an officer, contrary to usual
police procedure, had impounded defendant's car solely to create a
situation where an inventory search of the car would be appropriate.
Gilbert v. State, 4 presents an interesting factual situation. A
woman who was found in a roadway, claimed she had been as-
saulted. She was taken to the police station to be interviewed in
order to continue the investigation of her allegations. She made
several statements indicating that she had very strong suicidal
tendencies. The police became worried that she might carry out her
threats and, for her own protection, searched her jacket for weapons.
Instead they found marijuana. The court indicated that the genuine
concern of the officers gave them probable cause to search her jacket
and pocketbook to prevent her from harming herself, and held the
search reasonable. Another situation where a defendant was not
engaged in criminal activity but was searched nevertheless, was
Perry v. State." There defendant was "frisked" merely because he
was standing next to another person against whom an arrest warrant
was outstanding. The court reasoned that there was no probable
cause for the officer to believe that the defendant was armed and
dangerous and offered a threat to his safety. The evidence found in
the search was suppressed.
3. CONSENT TO SEARCH
Of course, a person can waive his fourth amendment rights, and
consent to a search. The issue raised by a waiver of this type is
whether the waiver is given freely and with understanding of all it
63. 291 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
64. 289 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 294 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1974).
65. 296 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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implies." This issue was confronted in Holt v. State,7 where the
court held that a threat made after consent was allegedly given, did
not alter the voluntariness of such consent.
Certain persons may give consent to a search of another's prop-
erty. This ability to give consent depends on the relationship be-
tween the person giving said consent and the area searched. In State
v. Dees" the police were invited into the defendant's house by his
wife who took them on a room-to-room tour of the home. She volun-
tarily gave them property which she identified as stolen. The trial
court held that she did not have the authority to consent to a search.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed, reasoning that
there was no search, as the wife voluntarily led the officers around
the home. " In a similar case, a mother, who was custodian of the
premises, was held to be able to consent to the search of her son's
bedroom."' An officer came to the defendant's home, spoke to his
mother, and informed her of the charges. He requested permission
to search the defendant's room for a jacket, stating that he did not
have a warrant. He also advised her that she could refuse him en-
trance, contact an attorney, and that anything found would be used
against the defendant in court. She then led the officer to the de-
fendant's room and produced the evidence sought. The court dis-
tinguished Bumper, finding no subterfuge as there had been in
Bumper, where the officers represented that they had a search war-
66. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), and Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973), where the United States Supreme Court held:
[Tihat the question whether a consent to a search was in fact "voluntary" or was
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances. While knowledge of the
right to refuse consent. is one factor to be taken into account, the government need
not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent. Id. at
227.
67. 302 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974). See also State v. Othen, 300 So. 2d 732 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1974); Mack v. State, 298 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
68. 280 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973), cert. discharged, 291 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1974).
69. The court distinguished State v. Blakely, 230 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), which
held that the husband-wife relationship, without more, does not impute authority to one
spouse to waive the other's constitutional right to demand a warrant for a premises search.
The court noted in Blakely that the wife consented only after the officer said he could get a
warrant if she did not consent. The court in the insta.nt case did not deal with the issue of
ownership or occupancy rights of the wife.




rant. The legal custodian of the premises could, therefore, give a
valid consent to search."
4. OTHER ISSUES
As in the case of consent searches, a border search may be
reasonable without probable cause. However, in Earnest v. State2
the defendant had not crossed the border between this country and
another. A port inspector nevertheless made a search of defendant's
pleasure boat without a warrant or probable cause. During the
search, defendant kicked a box containing marijuana into the water.
The State contended this constituted abandonment of the contra-
band. The court held that the search was illegal since it was not
shown that defendant had crossed the national border within a rea-
sonable time prior to this action. Since the search was illegal, the
abandonment did not make the evidence admissible.
The significance of the act of returning a search warrant has
created a split between the Second and Fourth Districts. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, in Nofs v. State,3 held that
the return of a search warrant is a ministerial act and any failure
to return the warrant using the procedure in section 933.07 of the
Florida Statutes 4 does not void the warrant unless prejudice is
shown. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reads the rule
literally, commanding the searching officers to return any evidence
found as the result of the search incident to a warrant to the issuing
magistrate or some other court having jurisdiction over the effects
with which the evidence is concerned. Therefore, if the return of the
search warrant is not according to the Florida statute, the warrant
becomes invalid.7 5
71. However a motel owner cannot give consent to have a guest's room searched. See
Sheff v. State, 301 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
72. 293 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
73. 295 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
74. FLA. STAT. § 933.07 (1973) provides that the judge or magistrate who examines the
application and proof submitted if satisfied the probable cause exists will issue a search
warrant,
commanding the officer or person forthwith to search the property described in
the warrant or the person named, for the property specified, and to bring the same
before the magistrate or some other court having jurisdiction of the offense.
75. Laiser v. State, 299 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). See also State v. Schectman, 291
So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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IV. INFORMATIONS AND GRAND JURIES
A. Informations
In Gerstein v. Pugh,7" the United States Supreme Court upheld,
in part, the holding of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida which declared the Florida information
rule and procedure unconstitutional." The Supreme Court held that
it is essential that an impartial magistrate determine probable
cause to believe that the defendant committed a crime. The Court
observed:
Although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants
prosecution affords a measure of protection against unfounded
detention, we do not think prosecutorial judgment standing alone
meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The second issue on appeal concerned the procedure of the
hearing itself. Concerning this issue, the Supreme Court indicated
that the district court and court of appeals had held that the proba-
ble cause determination must be accompanied by the full panoply
of adversary safeguards such as counsel, confrontation, cross-
examination, and compulsory process. 9 The Supreme Court held,
however:
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only by the lesser
consequences of a probable cause determination, but also by the
nature of the determination itself. It does not require the fine
resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or even
a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determina-
76. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
77. The procedure attacked in this case enabled a prosecutor to file an information based
on his sworn determination that there was probable cause to believe a crime had been
committed and that defendant had committed it. The defendant then could be jailed without
an opportunity for a probable cause determination by an impartial judicial officer.
This case first came to the federal courts as Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.
Fla. 1971). There the court demanded that the defendants (Dade County officials) submit a
plan for probable cause hearings before a judicial officer. This was done and ordered to be
implemented, 336 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla. 1972). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuif
stayed implementation pending appeal, and asked the district court to determine the consti-
tutionality of the amended Florida rules governing preliminary hearinga. The district court
found the procedure unconstitutional, 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1973). The fifth circuit
affirmed with minor modifications, Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F. 2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
78. 420 U.S. at 117.
79. Id. at 119.
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tions are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence sup-
ports a reasonable belief in guilt.80
Concurring Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall
agreed with the majority concerning the first point, but disagreed
with the second. As Justice Stewart observed:
Having determined that Florida's current pretrial detention pro-
cedures are constitutionally inadequate, I think it is unnecessary
to go further by way of dicta. In particular, I would not, in the
abstract, attempt to specify those procedural protections that
constitutionally need not be accorded . . .
Although an information must be exact, if the defendant delays
his attack upon the sufficiency of the information, he will lose his
opportunity to do so. Rule 3.190(c) of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide that the defendant must move to dismiss the
information before or upon arraignment, or waive his right to object.
In Caves v. State," the State omitted the element of intent to de-
prive in an information for auto theft. The defendant waited until
trial to move to quash the information on this basis. Prior to the
motion to quash and during the trial, the State had in fact shown
the necessary intent. The court, in reviewing the conviction, held
that the defendant had waived his right to object to the information
and had no recourse since this was not a fundamental error. In State
v. Miller,3 a felony information was attacked because it was signed
by an assistant state attorney. The Supreme Court of Florida held
that section 27.324 of the Florida Statutes supersedes section
27.181(3)" 4 of the Florida Statutes and provides that assistant state
attorneys appointed by each state attorney are vested with all pow-
80. Id. at 121.
81. Id. at 126, (Stewart, J., concurring).
82. 302 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
83. 313 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 1975).
84. FLA. STAT. § 27.181(3) provides:
Each assistant state attorney appointed by a state attorney under the authoriza-
tion of this act shall have all the powers and discharge all of the duties of the state
attorney appointing him, under the direction of said state attorney, except, how-
ever, that due to constitutional limitations, no such assistant may sign informa-
tions. He shall sign indictments and other official documents, except information,
as assistant state attorney, and, when so signed, the same shall have the same
force and effect as if signed by the state attorney.
FLA. STAT. § 27.324 provides:
The assistant state attorneys properly appointed by the state attorney are vested
with all the powers, duties, and responsibilities of state attorneys,
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ers, duties, and responsibilities of state attorneys. These powers
include the legal authorization to sign both felony and misdemeanor
informations."
B. Grand Juries
Section 905.17 (1973) of the Florida Statutes had expressly pro-
hibited anyone except "the witness under examination, the state
attorney or his designated assistant, the court reporter or stenogra-
pher, and the interpreter" from being present during a grand jury
proceeding. The presence of an unauthorized person was grounds for
dismissal. In Rudd v. State ex rel. Christian,"6 this rule was applied
to void an indictment, notwithstanding the fact that only an as-
signed state attorney and two assigned assistant state attorneys
from another district were present. The District Court of Appeal,
First District, had voided the indictment on the ground that the
conjunction "or" in the statute precluded simultaneous appearance
by a state attorney and an assistant state attorney at the same
grand jury proceeding. 7 The supreme court affirmed the result but
disapproved of the lower court's reasoning. The supreme court inter-
preted the conjunction "or" as a copulative "and" in order to effec-
tuate the intent of the legislature, and thus approved simultaneous
appearance by a state attorney and an assistant state attorney.
The court noted, however, that the assistant state attorneys in the
case were not "lawful and qualified" because they were improperly
assigned and affirmed the voiding of the indictment. 9
As noted above, there is a provision for the presence of a court
reporter during grand jury proceedings. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth District, in State v. McArthur"° considered the issue
of whether grand jury proceedings must be recorded. The court, in
85. The court stated that section 27.324 conforms to article V, section 17 of the Florida
Constitution which became effective on January 1, 1973. Section 17 of article V contains no
limitations on the power of the legislature to grant assistant state attorneys authority to sign
informations, as had been the construction given to section 10, article I and section 15 of
article V of the 1885 Constitution in State ex rel. Ricks v. Davidson, 121 Fla. 196, 163 So.
588 (1935). 313 So. 2d at 657.
86. 310 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1975).
87. State ex rel. Christian v. Rudd, 302 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
88. FLA. STAT. § 905.17 (1) (1973) was amended by the legislature to conform to the
construction given to it in this opinion. FLA. STAT. § 905.17 (1) (Supp. 1974).
89. 310 So. 2d at 298.
90. 296 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 306 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1974).
[Vol. 30:635
CRIMINAL LA W
holding that recording was not required 1 considered sections 905.17
and 905.27 (1973) of the Florida Statutes. The former section
provides for the presence of a court reporter, but does not mandate
the reporter's presence. The latter section provides that the reporter
must not disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the
grand jury. The court found no mandate from the legislature that a
court reporter or stenographer must be present although it did note
that there was a pending bill before the Florida Legislature mandat-
ing the presence of a court reporter or stenographer.
V. DISCOVERY
A. Exchange of Witness Lists
The reason behind the exchanging of witness lists is the preven-
tion of undue surprise when a certain witness is called, and to allow
the State to depose that witness before the trial. In C.A. W. v.
State," the defendant called a witness from the State's witness list.
The court held this to be permissible since no surprise should result.
In Thomas v. State," the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
in a per curiam decision, held that there was no reversible error
shown in the admission of the State's rebuttal witness whose name
was not previously disclosed to defendant's counsel. Also, the situa-
tion and facts of the case must be considered before a determination
of error is made. In Ansley v. State,94 defendant had another attor-
ney prior to the one who conducted his defense at trial. The prior
attorney was given the list of witnesses, but he did not turn it over
to the subsequent attorney. The trial court made a careful investiga-
tion into the circumstances and held that there was no prejudice to
the defendant. The District Court of Appeal, First District, af-
firmed.
B. Disclosure of Confidential Informants
In Ricketts v. State," a confidential informant was the only
witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of the
91. Accord, State v. Tucker, 301 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
92. 295 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
93. 296 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1974). See also
Kruglak v. State, 300 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
94. 302 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
95. 305 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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witnesses for the State. The State refused to reveal his name prior
to the trial, relying on the general rule that a confidential inform-
ant's name need not be given when he has given information in aid
of the prosecution." This general rule, however, does not apply when
the informer is an active participant in the offense and there is very
little or no independent evidence of the accused's guilt. The court,
in applying this exception, found that the informant's testimony
was necessary and that it was reversible error not to compel the
state to produce his name.
C. Affirmative Duties of the State
The State has an affirmative duty to disclose material evidence
tending to negate the defendant's guilt. 7 Similarly, admission of
material evidence not produced by the State on the defendant's
motion is error, although where defendant is caught "red-handed,"
it will be held to be harmless error. 8
Furthermore, the court may find the state attorney to be in
constructive possession of information he does not actually have in
his possession. In Taylor v. State,9" the court said the state attorney
was in constructive possession of a statement made by defendant
that was overheard by two police officers. The state attorney was
actually informed of the defendant's statement shortly before the
trial, so that he was not in actual possession of the statement until
that time. However, the court allowed admission of the statement
observing that if the defendant were surprised and his defense preju-
diced, he could have asked for a continuance. The court indicated,
however, that if such practice were continued, it might be necessary
to rule such evidence inadmissible to enforce discovery require-
ments.
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that the State must
produce any criminal records of potential state witnesses that are
in its actual or constructive possession.'0 These records are in the
State's possession if: (1) they are in the physical possession of any
state prosecutorial or law enforcement office, or (2) the State has
96. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
97. Wilcox v. State, 299 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974) (dictum).
98. McHaney v. State, 295 So. 2d 355, 356 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
314 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1975).
99. 292 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 298 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1974).
100. State v. Coney, 294 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1974).
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fingerprints of the witnesses, thereby giving it access into a federal
information system that uses fingerprints as a basis of identifica-
tion."" Also, if the State does not have the fingerprints in its files,
but is able to obtain them through the witness' voluntary operation,
then the State should do so. The State is not required to actually
obtain fingerprints of the witness, but upon request by the defen-
dant, after exhaustion of all other available means and remedies, it
must ask the witness if he would consent to be fingerprinted. The
witness, of course, must be informed as to the reason for this finger-
printing. Should he decline, the State is then under no further obli-
gation to provide his fingerprints.
D. Affirmative Duties of the Court
Should one of the parties in an action not make discovery, the
trial court has an affirmative duty to make careful inquiry into the
reasons for such a lapse, the extent of the prejudice to both parties
and the feasibility of rectifying any prejudice that it should find by
some intermediate procedure.'"' Applying this rule in Kruglak v.
State,"3 the District Court of Appeal, Third District, found that the
trial judge did, in fact, make the requisite inquiries. Here, defen-
dant's motion for discovery was not made pursuant to any specific
rule and never set down for hearing. The trial judge, becoming
aware of this failure after the jury was sworn, offered the defendant
an opportunity to speak with the individual witnesses that the pros-
ecution would call. This was found to be sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of attempting to rectify any prejudice, and since the
defendant's attorney refused this offer, there was no reversible
error. 04
VI. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Generally
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, '5 the United States Supreme Court
extended the right to counsel embodied in the sixth amendment to
all cases which might result in a loss of liberty. In Rollins v. State,06
101. Id. at 87.
102. Sheridan v. State, 258 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
103. 300 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
104. See also Lewis v. State, 298 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
105. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
106. 299 So. 2d 586 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974).
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defendant Rollins pled guilty to various traffic violations without
the benefit of counsel or being informed of the right to counsel. She
was fined $843.00, and was told that in default of such payment, she
would be incarcerated. Defendant Brown, charged with a misde-
meanor, similarly pled guilty and was sentenced to pay a $256.00
fine, or, in default, be incarcerated. Neither was able to pay and
both were incarcerated. In a subsequent hearing, after a public de-
fender had been appointed, it was argued that Argersinger was vio-
lated since neither had an attorney when they were sentenced. Both
sides stipulated that if the cases presented only a violation of the
rule in Tate v. Short,107 then the defendants' relief would be only
release from incarceration and not new trials. The latter view was
adopted by the trial court, which released the defendants and
stayed execution of their fines pending appeal. The appeal was
heard by the Supreme Court of Florida, which held that the penalty
for the convictions in the trial court was not incarceration, and that
the incarceration penalty arose only after the fines were not paid.
Therefore, the court allowed the convictions to stand, finding there
was no violation of Argersinger or Tate. In considering the Tate
issues, the court felt that there was no violation since the appellants
were released after they had established their indigency. The court
indicated that an indigent, when sentenced in the alternative to a
fine or imprisonment, must be given an opportunity to pay the fine,
and that this could usually be accomplished by deferring imposition
of sentence. It has become common practice for courts, who have
found that the defendant is not able to pay his fine at that time, to
allow personal payment or timed payment, according to the defen-
dant's ability to pay. The court further indicated, however, that
"[iun no event shall an indigent be imprisoned for nonpayment of
a fine by means of an alternative sentence, but, in the absence of
an alternative sentence, an indigent may be sentenced to imprison-
ment." 0 '
Defendant, an airline passenger, was searched, and contraband
was seized when he satisfied the criteria of the "skyjacker profile"
as developed by the Federal Aviation Administration. During the
hearing on a motion to suppress the evidence, the State's witness,
107. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). The United States Supreme Court held that the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids the incarceration of a defendant who is not
able to pay a fine, where a defendant who is able to pay the fine is allowed to go free.
108. 299 So. 2d at 589.
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a federal marshall, refused to testify concerning this profile. This
refusal was made as a result of direct orders from the Justice
Department. The State asked for an in camera proceeding with only
the judge, witness, and court reporter present. The trial judge re-
fused to conduct the hearing in this manner and the State appealed.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed, holding
that the defendant's counsel must be allowed to be present at a
hearing of this type.' "9 While the hearing does not decide the issue
of guilt or innocence of the defendant, it is clearly a critical stage of
the prosecution. As such, the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment, which guarantees the accused in a criminal trial the
right to confront witnesses against him, is applicable.
A defendant does not forfeit his right to counsel by disagreeing
with the tactics or ideas of his public defender. In Taylor v. State,,"
the defendant and his public defender had a disagreement which
resulted in the public defender petitioning to withdraw from the
case. The trial court refused to appoint new counsel for the defen-
dant but allowed him to conduct the trial pro se. The appellate
court, after considering the record, held that the defendant did not
voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The court further held that
when the public defender seeks to withdraw on his own motion, a
substitute counsel should be appointed unless it clearly appears,
upon proper inquiry, that the defendant intelligently elected to
waive his rights.
B. Adequacy of Counsel
A defendant also has the right to be represented by counsel that
is adequate, effective and competent. In Ross v. State,"' a defen-
dant was allowed delayed appellate review where it became appar-
ent that the public defender did not utilize an obvious insanity
defense. Prior to the trial, the public defender requested the defen-
dant to plead guilty. Defendant declined to do so and requested a
jury trial. The public defender acquiesced grudgingly. Prior to the
trial, defendant made known to the public defender that he had a
history of mental disturbances and that it was likely that a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity could be made. However, the public
109. State v. Sigerson, 282 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
110. 295 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
111. 287 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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defender did not file a notice of intent to plead not guilty by reason
of insanity, as required by the rules of criminal procedure. During
the trial, testimony of a psychiatrist offered on behalf of the defen-
dant was excluded. The public defender did not object, nor on ap-
peal argue this point. The appellate court, in considering the trial
court record, found that the defendant did not have adequate coun-
sel and appointed successor counsel with directions to file another
appellate brief. It would now seem, at least in the Second District,
that the actions of public defenders in providing adequate represen-
tation for indigents is coming under closer judicial scrutiny. This
can only result in better protection of the rights of indigents."2
VII. PRELIMINARY HEARINGS
The issue of whether a. defendant has the right to call witnesses
at a preliminary hearing was answered in the affirmative by the
District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Johnson v.
Strickland."3 The trial judge had refused a request to call a witness
requested by the defense, reasoning that the standard was probable
cause, not reasonable doubt, and that probable cause had been
established. The appellate court held that a judge has ample au-
thority to prevent the preliminary hearing from becoming a discov-
ery proceeding, but that authority should not be exercised by the
curtailment of legitimate inquiry into grounds for belief of probable
cause. As long as the inquiry is made in good faith, Florida Rules
afford defendants the right to cross-examine the State's witnesses
and offer their own.
112. In other cases touching on the right to counsel issue the following rulings were made:
In Stansel v. State, 297 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2d. Dist. 1974) it was held that the trial court erred
in considering in camera evidence in a bail proceeding, thus denying the accused his rights
of cross-examination and confrontation. The court described this as an adversary proceeding
thus implying right to counsel. In Vena v. State, 295 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 3d. Dist. 1974), cert.
denied, 307 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1975), the court said that while there is no need for counsel at
fingerprinting, failure to ,notify counsel of the taking of prints may be reversible error. In
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that counsel
was not required at a probable cause hearing since it was not a "critical stage" of the criminal
process. Finally, in State ex rel. Rash v. Williams, 302 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d. Dist. 1974), an
action for a writ of prohibition, the court did not reach the question of whether an attorney
must be present during a mental examination pursuant to section 917.14(1)(b) of the Florida
Statutes, which is an investigation to determine if defendant is a mentally disordered sex
offender.




A. Sufficiency of Affidavit for Wiretap
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Rodriguez v. State,"4 ad-
dressed the issues of the sufficiency of an affidavit for wiretap and
whether the recordings made pursuant to this wiretap should be
suppressed for failure to minimize unauthorized interception of cer-
tain innocent telephone conversations." 5 The court, after examining
the appropriate statute,I" held that the affidavit was insufficient to
establish probable cause for belief that the offense in question was
being committed or was about to be committed,"' and that the
phones sought to be tapped were, or were about to be, used in
connection with commission of that offense."' The affidavit in ques-
tion alleged that the dwelling had three different phone numbers
which were listed under three different names of occupants of the
home. It further alleged that the affiant had, 38 days prior to the
date of the affidavit, received a statement given by a woman, which
said that her husband worked for the defendant in a gambling oper-
ation. It also alleged that the defendant's stepdaughter's ex-boy-
friend had seen gambling operations taking place on the premises
sometime in the past. The court, in considering the totality of the
affidavit, found it to be stale. The two key allegations, those of the
woman and the boyfriend, concerned past circumstances, and there-
fore did not comply with the statute. The court then observed that
these facts indicated grounds for suspicion but were not sufficient
to establish probable cause that the offense continued.
B. Minimization of Unauthorized Interceptions
The second issue in Rodriguez concerned minimization of un-
authorized interception of matters not dealing with the crime. This
issue was one of first impression in Florida. The court, therefore,
relied upon the appropriate federal rule"9 and the federal cases
construing its use.'"" The court noted that in the federal cases the
114. 297 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1974). For a later case dealing with wiretaps without probable
cause see State v. Alphonse, 315 So. 2d. 506 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
115. This issue will be discussed in section B, infra.
116. FLA. STAT. § 934.09(3)(1973).
117. Id. at (3)(a).
118. Id. at (3)(d).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970).
120. See United States v. Manfredi, 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973).
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courts considered factors such as whether or not privileged commu-
nications were intercepted, the percentage of interceptions
terminated as nonpertinent, whether authorization was limited to
interception of certain types of conversations, and whether there
was judicial supervision over the actual interception procedures.
The court held that the requisite minimization effort had not been
shown. The court then discussed the three different remedies devel-
oped by the federal courts where the requisite minimization effort
has not been made. One group of cases'2' holds that only that por-
tion of evidence obtained in violation of the minimization require-
ments should be suppressed. A second group'22 holds that where
minimization requirements are not met, all wiretap evidence must
be suppressed. The third group of cases' 3 holds that where minimi-
zation procedures are blatantly ignored, all evidence must be
suppressed, but where violations occur despite efforts to minimize,
only unauthorized interceptions need be suppressed. The Supreme
Court of Florida chose this third position.
C. Wiretaps Subsequent to Information
In Scaldeferri v. State,'24 defendants were planning a robbery
and enlisted the aid of two other men who were undercover agents
"wired for sound." After the first meeting, an information was filed
and warrants for the arrest of defendants were issued. During the
second meeting, which was arranged during the first, the agents
were again "wired." These tapes were admitted into evidence and
the defendants sought to appeal denial of their motion to suppress.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, distinguishing
Massiah v. United States,'5 held that a recording of a meeting
which occurred before arrest but after an information Was filed was
admissible where the meeting had been arranged prior to the filing.
The Massiah opinion recognized the right of the government to
121. E.g., United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972).
122. E.g., United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772 (6th Cir. 1973).
123. E.g., United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp. 929 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
124. 294 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d 2, (Fla. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 993 (1975).
125. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah, a co-defendant was cooperating with the govern-
ment and met Masr ah in a place that was "wired for sound." The co-defendant elicited
incriminating statements from Massiah after he was arrested, had employed an attorney, was
arraigned, and had pled not guilty. The Supreme Court held that the information elicited
was not admissible into evidence.
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continue its investigation after an indictment; however, it forbade
the use of trickery to obtain incriminating statements after arrest
and retention of counsel. The court held that Massiah did not apply
since the meeting that was recorded was held prior to arrest and
prior to retention of counsel.
D. Eavesdropping by a Private Person
In Horn v. State,'26 a critical telephone call was intercepted by
a private person. Defendant attempted to suppress the contents of
this telephone message, but was unsuccessful in the lower court. On
appeal, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that the
evidence obtained was inadmissible. The court considered Florida
Statutes section 934.06 (1973), which makes inadmissible any
evidence obtained by an interception of a telephone call that is not
authorized by law. The court then observed that a person who,
without authorization, eavesdrops on another's telephone conversa-
tion is guilty of a third degree misdemeanor. Therefore, reasoned
the court, the evidence obtained by this illegal eavesdropping was
inadmissible since the eavesdropper did not lawfully intercept the
conversation.
IX. BAIL
In State ex rel. Harrington v. Genung,12 7 defendant applied for
release on his own recognizance pursuant to section 924.071(2)
(1973) of the Florida Statutes. This section provides that "[a] de-
fendant in custody whose case is stayed either automatically or by
order of the court [while the state takes an appeal] shall be re-
leased on his recognizance pending the appeal if he is charged with
a bailable offense." Defendant contended that the trial court had
no discretion and erred by setting bail at $20,000 for one count of
the indictment. The court indicated that, generally, the power to
admit a person to bail is a judicial function and thus must be free
from legislative encroachment. Then, relying on Simmons v.
State, ' 8 the court held that the word "shall" must be interpreted
as merely directory and not mandatory, and denied defendant's
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
126. 298 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
127. 300 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
128. 160 Fla. 629, 36 So. 2d 207 (1948).
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X. SPECIFIC CRIMES
A. Assault
An essential element of assault is the performance of some act
which creates in the victim a well-founded fear of violence. Applying
this rule, the court in White v. State2 ' held that when the facts of
a case show that the victim did not see the bottle which struck him,
nor the person who threw it, it was reversible error not to instruct
the jury as to the above-mentioned element.
B. Breaking and Entering, Burglary
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Hill v. State,"
held that a gasoline storage tank was not a "vessel" as contemplated
by section 810.05 of the Florida Statutes. 3' The court, construing
this statute which concerns breaking and entering, indicated that
the word "vessel" in the context of the statute meant a marine
structure intended for transport, not a container for liquid.
Grand larceny is not a lesser included offense in the crime of
breaking and entering a building with the intent to commit a felony,
to wit: grand larceny. Thus, breaking and entering to commit a
felony is an entirely separate offense from the felony which is in-
tended. A defendant may be convicted of either crime, or both, but
the "evidence essential to prove one is not essential to the conviction
for the other."'32
Where the State's only evidence of an intent to commit grand
larceny is that the building broken into contained property valued
in excess of $100, such evidence is not sufficient to prove intent. This
was the holding in West v. State'33 where defendant was arrested
after breaking into his former place of employment. Defendant only
had two keys to the building in his possession when arrested, and
items of personal property in the building with a value in excess of
$100 were not taken. Similarly, Jackson v. State'34 held that defen-
dants who had broken into a dwelling containing property in excess
129. 299 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
130. 302 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
131. FLA. STAT. § 810.05 was repealed by Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-383, effective July 1,
1975.
132. Ashley v. State, 292 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
133. 289 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
134. 300 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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of $100 and who were in such dwelling for a very short period of time
and took nothing, were not guilty of breaking and entering with the
intent to commit grand larceny. The court reversed and remanded
with directions to enter judgments against the defendants for break-
ing and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, to wit: petit
larceny.
In Vinson v. State,'35 however, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, reached a different result on the issue of intent to
commit grand larceny. Defendant was apprehended shortly after
committing the crime, and the stolen goods found in his automobile
had a total value of less than $160. The appellate court, neverthe-
less, sustained defendant's conviction for breaking and entering
with intent to commit a felony, to wit: grand larceny. It reasoned
that there was other evidence sufficient to show the requisite intent
to commit grand larceny. The court stated,
[t]he record reveals first that there were additional items of
value on the premises. In addition, the evidence shows that a
strongbox was broken into which contained only non-negotiable
securities, drawers were searched, and that appellant was pre-
vented from completing whatever his mission may have been by
the return of the occupants . . . .
The above cases can be reconciled by using the court's reason-
ing in Platt v. State.'37 In that case, the court stated that the requi-
site intent needed to prove grand larceny may be shown either by
evidence of the market value of what was actually stolen, or by other
evidence or circumstances. In Jackson and West, the "other evi-
dence or circumstances" showed only that the defendants had bro-
ken and entered the building in question and left without taking
anything, or only taking items worth less than $100. In the Vinson
case, however, defendant had conducted a thorough search and had
rifled the strongbox. This, coupled with the fact that the evidence
indicated he was caught in the act and prevented from completing
his mission by the return of the occupants, was sufficient to support
the jury's conclusion that there was an intent to steal goods of a
value in excess of $100. What may have been the determinative
factor in Vinson was the fact that the defendant had been prevented
135. 300 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
136. Id. at 715.
137. 291 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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from completing the act, and it could be inferred that he had
intended to take and would have taken more but for the interrup-
tion. This factor distinguishes Vinson from West, and apparently
from Jackson also, although the Jackson court gives few facts. Also,
it should be noted that the Vinson court considered the value of the
items on the premises as a factor to be considered in determining
intent.
C. Conspiracy
Where two or more persons conspire with another person, who,
unknown to them, is a government agent, to commit an offense
under an agreement with an intention that an essential ingredient
of the offense is to be performed only by the agent, such persons
cannot be convicted of conspiracy." 8 This rule was held not to apply
in Betancourt v. State,3 ' where the court found an offer to sell
contraband sufficient to convict for sale, and that an actual pur-
chase is not an essential element of unlawful sale of marijuana. In
Young v. State,4 " Betancourt was cited to affirm a conviction of one
charged with conspiracy to sell cannabis to a police officer. How-
ever, the dissenting judge, citing King, would have reversed, as the
conspiracy was to sell to a police officer, and since the officer was
an essential ingredient to the conspiracy charged, defendant could
not be legally convicted.'
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Little v.
State,' held that a conviction for assault with intent to murder is
tainted by evidence of conspiracy which does not link defendant to
the planning of the crime. In order to prosecute successfully for
conspiracy, the evidence must directly connect the defendant to the
planning of the crime. Persons who aid and abet, as did defendant,
have the same criminal responsibility as the principal, but this
responsibility does not include conspiracy. Separate evidence of
complicity in the conspiracy is a prerequisite to admissibility of
evidence concerning details of the conspiracy, with which the ac-
cused is not directly linked. The defendant, therefore, was correct
in contesting the admissibility of the evidence concerning the de-
138. King v. State, 104 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1957).
139. 228 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
140. 291 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
141. Id. at 660 (Owen, C.J., dissenting).
142. 293 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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tails of the conspiracy at times when he was absent. The case was
reversed and remanded for a new trial, even though there was ample
evidence of defendant's guilt as an aider and abetter, and the court
would have felt obliged to affirm had the conspiracy count not been
added.
D. Misprision of a Felony
In Holland v. State,4 ' defendant, City Manager of the City of
Pinellas Park, Florida, found that his assistant was growing mari-
juana in his backyard. He informed the chief of police, city council-
men, and other officials, who agreed with him'that the city should
be spared the embarrassment of a criminal prosecution and that
discharge of the offender from his post would be an appropriate
penalty. The defendant was subsequently indicted for misprision
of a felony, which is the common law crime of failure to report a
felony. While the court noted that on the facts stated it could find
that the defendant had done all that he was required to do under
the common law, and thus was not guilty of misprision, it did not
decide the case on this basis. Rather, it decided the issue of
whether misprision of felony was included in Florida's adoption of
the common law, by section 775.01 of the Florida Statutes.44 The
court interpreted that statute to mean that the legislature granted
the courts the necessary discretion to prevent the blind adherence
to the common law where it was unsuited to the modern context.
Then, after examining the origins of misprision and the cases of
other districts concerning the judicial use of the common law, the
court held that misprision was not suited to American criminal law,
and was not adopted into Florida substantive law by section 775.01.
E. Narcotics
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in State v.
Vinson," ' was presented with the interesting issue of whether a pre-
scription issued by a doctor and given to another person, that was
not issued in good faith in the course of his professional practice,
143. 302 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974). For an in-depth consideration of this case, see
30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 222 (1975).
144. FLA. STAT. § 775.01 (1973) states: "The common law of England in relation to
crimes, except so far as the same relates to modes and degrees of punishment, shall be of full
force in this state where there is no existing provision by statute on the subject."
145. 298 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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constituted a constructive delivery of drugs so as to violate the
Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Control Act. 4' The
court held that the delivery was such as to give constructive posses-
sion of the drugs. As the court said, "one is said to have constructive
possession of a chattel when he has the ability to maintain control
over it or reduce it to his physical possession even though he does
not have actual personal dominion."'' 1 Thus, the court reasoned
that it would seem reasonable to assume that by the inclusion of the
words "actual or constructive" in the definition of delivery in the
statute, the legislature intended to encompass a situation where a
doctor, by reason of his right to issue prescriptions, does so in bad
faith and thereby provides a method of obtaining controlled drugs.
The court also addressed the issue of whether it would be necessary
for the prescription to be filled before the felony could be commit-
ted. It returned to the wording of the statute and noted that delivery
was defined as the "actual, constructive or attempted transfer."'4
Therefore, the court reasoned that one who attempts to make a
transfer is guilty of the substantive offense even though the transfer
is not successful. Because of the definition of delivery, he is just as
guilty where the transfer of the drug never takes place as where it
does.
F. Obscenity
The constitutionality of section 847.05 of the Florida Statutes
(1973), which relates to obscene language, was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Florida in Jones v. State.'45 The defendant's
contention was that the statute prohibiting the use or utterance of
any indecent or obscene language was unconstitutional on the
ground of overbreadth. The court first examined defendant's lan-
guage and found it to be indecent and obscene. The court then
observed that at common law, any outrage of decency was a crime.
In the words of the court, "[n]o distortion of the Constitution (state
or United States) should prevent our Legislature from keeping its
146. FLA. STAT. ch. 893 (1973).
147. 298 So. 2d at 507.
148. Id. at 509.
149. 293 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1974), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1081 (1975). FLA. STAT. § 847.05
(1973) provides: "any person who shall publicly use or utter any indecent or obscene language
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree . ..."
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people free from obscene and foul language."'5 The court then de-
termined that the words of the statute established a standard by
which an average citizen of common understanding would reasona-
bly be aware of what conduct was prohibited by the statute. The
court thus held that the statute came within constitutional bounds
and was not void for overbreadth. Justice Ervin dissented, noting
that the statute did not bother to specifically limit, define, or de-
scribe indecent or obscene language within the context of recognized
constitutional limitations. He felt that the statute should define the
nature of the obscene language prohibited and should be restricted
"to references of sexual acts of a prurient nature, and limiting it to
situations involving 'fighting words' or breaches of the peace."'"
G. Receiving Stolen Goods
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, was presented
with an issue of first impression in Florida concerning the "corpus
delicti" of the crime of buying, receiving, or aiding in the conceal-
ment of stolen property. 52 At trial, the State established that defen-
dant had succeeded in pawning a stolen calculator. Over a defense
objection that the corpus delecti was not otherwise proven, the State
also introduced defendant's statement which involved his telling
police that after asking one Holmes whether the calculator was
"hot," he, the defendant, agreed to pawn the machine for Holmes
in exchange for a $10 payment, and did so. Defendant also told
police that Holmes asked him to pawn the machine because he,
Holmes, did not have the necessary identification. The problem as
to admissibility arises from the fact that an extrajudicial confession
by the defendant cannot be used to obtain a criminal conviction
unless there is prima facie evidence of the corpus delicti of the crime
independent of the confession. The court first examined the Florida
definition of corpus delicti. It found that in Florida law, corpus
delicti consists of showing "both (a) the fact that the crime charged
150. Id. at 34. See also Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1973)(concerning lewd and
lascivious materials); Papp v. State, 281 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), quashed, 298 So.
2d 374 (Fla. 1974).
151. 293 So. 2d at 35, (Ervin, J., dissenting). See Canney v. State, 298 So. 2d 495 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1975), where the defendant was arrested
under a similar municipal ordinance for saying "goddamn."
152. McQueen v. State, 304 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 4th Dist.), cert. denied, 315 So. 2d 193 (Fla.
1975).
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has been committed, and (b) that some person is criminally respon-
sible for it."' 3 The problem presented in this case was that the State
had failed to show that the crime charged had been committed
because there was no showing that defendant had knowledge of, or
reason to know of, the stolen character of the machine. 5 ' In revers-
ing the conviction and discharging the defendant, the court held
that actual or implied knowledge that the goods in question are
stolen is a necessary element of the crime of buying, receiving, or
aiding in the concealment of stolen property.
H. Worthless Checks
In Dirk v. State,'55 defendant was arrested and charged with
passing a worthless check in violation of section 832.05(3) of the
Florida Statutes (1973).111 On appeal he claimed that the entire
chapter was violative of his rights to due process and against self-
incrimination under the federal and state constitutions. Specifi-
cally, he attacked section 832.05(6) which provides that
in all prosecutions under this section, the introduction in evi-
dence of any unpaid and dishonored check, draft, or other written
order, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written
thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as afore-
said, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or uttering of
said check . . . shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
insufficient funds in or credit with such drawee ....
The majority opinion found no reason to recede from its previous
decisions upholding the constitutionality of the statute. Justices
Ervin and Dekle dissented in part, reasoning that the simple return
of a check did not meet federal constitutional standards for such a
153. Id. at 502.
154. FLA. STAT. § 811.16 (1973) provides: "Whoever buys, receives, or aids in the conceal-
ment of stolen money, goods, or property, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be
guilty of a felony .. " This section was amended by Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-383, effective
July 1, 1975, and transferred to § 812.031.
155, 305 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1974).
156, This section makes it unlawful for any person or corporation to obtain anything of
value by means of a check or other written order upon any bank, person, or corporation,
knowing at the time of the making that the maker does not have sufficient funds or credit to
pay same on presentation. However, no crime may be charged if payee knows or has reason
to know that drawer does not have sufficient funds to insure payment.
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prima facie presumption.' 7 These constitutional standards are the
"more likely than not" standard (the presumed fact is more likely
than not to flow from the proven fact on which it is made to depend)
enunciated in Leary v. United States,'8 and the "reasonable doubt"
standard (the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is suffi-
cient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasona-
ble doubt) enunciated in Barnes v. United States.'59 Justice Ervin
felt that the statute failed to meet these standards. He listed eight
situations where a check might be returned for insufficient funds in
which it would be both "beyond a reasonable doubt" and "more
likely than not" that the maker had no criminal knowledge of insuf-
ficient funds and intent to defraud.'"" Having found that the section
of the statute failed these constitutional tests, Justice Ervin argued
that subsection (6) appeared to be violative of a defendant's consti-
tutional right against self-incrimination and also violated the rule
that statutory presumptions may not operate retrospectively. In
summary, Judge Ervin felt that in light of the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Barnes, the Florida court should reconsi-
der its position regarding the constitutionality of the statutory pre-
sumptions under the statute in question. He did, however, find the
remainder of the statute constitutional and felt it should be pre-
served.''
XI. SEVERANCE
Defendant Wilson and another defendant were arrested under
a five count information. The first three counts involved the co-
defendant only, and the last two counts involved the defendant
only. There was, in fact, no connection between the two defendants
and none was alleged in the information. Wilson moved several
times for severance, claiming that the joinder on the information
was improper. The trial court did not grant these motions and the
defendant appealed from his conviction and sentence. The District
Court of Appeal, First District, reversed,' 2 holding that a defendant
is entitled to severance upon a motion, where the information did
157. 305 So. 2d at 188 (Ervin, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
158. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
159. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
160. 305 So. 2d at 190.
161. Id.
162. Wilson v. State, 298 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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not meet the requirements of Rule 3.150(b) of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure.6 3 The court, answering the State's argument
that defendant failed to show any prejudice resulting from joinder,
held that if the charging document does not meet the requirements
of Rule 3.150(b), a defendant is entitled (upon motion) to severence
without a demonstration of prejudice. The onus is on the State to
show its authority for joining several defendants in one indictment
or information.
In Elias v. State,' 4 the joinder of two defendants was proper in
that defendant Rodriguez allegedly aided and abetted defendant
Elias in the sale of narcotics. Defendant Elias sought severance on
the grounds that the defenses that would be presented during trial
were antagonistic, and because certain federal charges were pending
against defendant Rodriguez, and Rodriguez was characterized by
the news media as a "reputed heroin kingpin." He also objected that
certain testimony that would be offered against Rodriguez to show
a general pattern of criminality would prejudice his case. Elias cited
Suarez v. State"'5 to support the argument that severance should be
granted to avoid the effects of the above mentioned testimony. The
court distinguished the Elias situation observing that the Suarez
rationale was not simply that error occurred because competent
evidence was offered against one defendant which was inadmissible
as to others, but that such evidence was prejudicial to the defen-
dants against whom the evidence was inadmissible (court's empha-
sis). The court said Suarez did not hold that whenever evidence
competent against one defendant but inadmissible against another
is offered in a joint trial there must be a severence. Turning to the
instant case, the court found that the lower court had clearly in-
structed the jury that the testimony concerning Rodriguez was ad-
missible only against him and not against Elias. Further, the wit-
nesses had testified that they had never known of any drug transac-
tion which involved defendant Elias. The court then held that the
admission of the testimony was not prejudicial to defendant Elias
and upheld the conviction.
It is questionable whether the court's analysis of, and reliance
163. This rule allows two or more defendant's to be charged in the same indictment or
information when each is charged with accountability for all offenses, each defendant is
charged with conspiracy, or the several offenses charged are part of a common scheme or plan.
164. 301 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1975).
165. 95 Fla. 42, 115 So. 519 (Fla. 1928).
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upon, Suarez is well founded. In its summary of Suarez in the in-
stant case, the court indicated that the supreme court had observed
in Suarez, that even if a cautionary instruction had been given, it
was doubtful whether the prejudicial effect of the testimony could
be removed from the minds of the jurors.6 ' It would seem, therefore,
that the court could just as easily have found the cautionary instruc-
tion to have been limited in its effectiveness and held the other way.
XII. PLEAS AND PLEA BARGAINING
In Davis v. State, 7 the Supreme Court of Florida dealt with an
issue raised by the plea bargaining system. The question presented
was:
[W]hen a judge who has participated in or tentatively approved
a plea bargain decides not to include the concessions contem-
plated therein in his final disposition of the case and affirma-
tively offers the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty
plea, may the defendant refuse to withdraw his plea on the
ground that the plea bargain is a specifically enforceable
contract? 6"
The court held that the defendant could not specifically enforce the
plea bargain. The court further indicated that if the plea bargain is
not carried out the defendant has two alternatives: (1) withdraw his
plea and proceed to disposition without any of his admissions, state-
ments, or other evidence given during plea negotiations being used
against him; or (2) the defendant may agree to proceed with the
guilty plea without being bound by any conditions or agreements.
The court also spoke with approval of the plea bargaining safe-
guards prescribed by Santobello v. New York."6' These are as fol-
lows: (1) the accused pleading guilty must be counseled, absent a
waiver; (2) the sentencing judge must develop the factual basis for
the plea on the record; (3) the plea must be voluntarily and know-
ingly made; and (4) if the plea was induced by promises, the essence
of the promises must be made known. 7 °
166. 301 So. 2d at 115.
167. 308 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1975).
168. ID. at 29. For an earlier response by the First District to a similar problem see
Kurlin v. State, 302 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
169. 404 U.S. 257 (1974).
170. Id. at 260. Failure of a court to inquire into the existence of factual basis for
defendant's plea of guilty to a manslaughter charge was held to be harmless error in Grant
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XIII. TRIAL'
A. Speedy Trial, Rule 3.191
1. SPEEDY TRIAL WITHOUT DEMAND
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and by section 16 of the
Declaration of Rights in the Florida Constitution of 1968. Rule 3.191
of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure was promulgated by the
Supreme Court of Florida "to implement the constitutionally guar-
anteed right to a speedy trial."'72
Rule 3.191 is a complex rule and, therefore, there is considera-
ble controversy regarding its application. In the recent decision of
Rubiera v. Dade County ex rel. Benitez,' dissenting Justice Ervin
expressed criticism of judicial construction of this rule:
Since adoption of the present speedy trial rule, I have witnessed
the pronouncement of several opinions of this court rationalizing
away express language of the Rule and fashioning "loopholes" for
the prosecution and trial court when time periods of the Rule
have run. Apparently our trial courts and prosecutors cannot
meet the requirements of the Rule and are continually before this
court to find "ways out."
I think the most forthright thing to do is to either drop the Rule
or substantially modify it. This would avoid the continual ration-
alization of the express language of the Rule which is no credit
to this court.
I have carefully reviewed our speedy trial decisions since we
adopted the Rule and am convinced that now the Rule is greatly
emasculated. It has become by our interpretations more a pre-
tense and sham than a real mechanism to further the speedy
disposition of criminal cases.'
v. State, 303 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), affirmed, 316 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1975), where the
defendant did not allege that he was prejudiced by this failure. See also Suggs v. State, 304
So. 2d 463 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), where a favorable plea bargain was held to show sufficient
facts so that the trial judge did not have to make a more detailed determination of defend-
ant's understanding of his plea.
171. The materials concerning evidence are covered in Survey of Florida Law-Evidence,
30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 561 (1976).
172. Turnor v. Olliff, 281 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973), citing, State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Willis, 255 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
173. 305 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1974).
174. Id. at 166.
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Rule 3.191(a)(1) provides for speedy trial without demand.
Every person charged by indictment or information must be
brought to trial within 90 days if the crime charged is a misde-
meanor and within 180 days if it is a felony. The time period begins
to run when the person is arrested-for the crime charged. The only
requirement incumbent upon the defendant is to be continuously
available for trial.
Several decisions during this period have dealt with the ques-
tion of what constitutes "continuously available for trial." In State
ex rel. Covington v. Rowe'75 the court found that the initial burden
of showing that a defendant was not available for trial lies with the
State. The defendant had failed to appear at a hearing due to im-
proper notice by the State. She subsequently appeared for trial
twice, and the trial was reset both times. However, defendant did
not appear on the third date set for trial. The court found that the
State had not met its burden of showing unavailability, and that the
defendant had met any possible burden upon her to show she was
continuously available. It appears from the decision that very short
notice was given for the third trial date.'76
The Supreme Court of Florida considered the question in great
depth in Rubiera v. Dade County ex rel. Benitez.'7 The defendant
was charged with a misdemeanor, and under Rule 3.191(a)(1) was
entitled to be brought to trial within 90 days in the metropolitan
court. Defendant was involved in discovery and due to an error in
the clerk's office, the subpoenas for depositions were not served until
the day before the 90 day period was to end. A motion to discharge
was filed pursuant to 3.191(d)(1) and was denied. Upon motion of
the defendant, the circuit court entered a writ of prohibition and
ordered the defendant discharged. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, affirmed.
The supreme court quashed the decision and discharged the
writ. The court found that the defendant was not "continuously
available" for trial within the meaning of Rule 3.191(a)(1) because
he was involved in pretrial preparation. The court reasoned that
discovery is one of the reasonable delays envisioned by
3.191(d)(2).111 However, since the defendant did not receive an ex-
175. 281 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
176. Id. at 72.
177. 305 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1974).
178. Rule 3.191(d)(2) provides for extending or waiving the time periods established by
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tension by court order, he fell within 3.191(d)(3), 175 and the delay
was unexcused. Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to trial
within the original 90 days. In dissent, Justice Ervin pointed out
that the majority had in effect construed "continuously available for
trial" to mean "prepared for trial." Rule 3.191(c) requires that the
defendant be prepared for trial, but this section applies only to
demands for speedy trial, and not to speedy trial without demand.
As the dissent states, "[e]quating a defendant's discovery efforts
with 'unavailability' to avoid discharge of a defendant for failure to
afford him a speedy trial has no foundation in the Rule."'""
In Rubiera the supreme court stated that a court order is crucial
if an extension of time is to be allowed under 3.191(d)(2) and (3). 11
The requirement of a court order was controlling in Mullin v.
State.' Defendant was not brought to trial for 223 days following a
suppression hearing because of an interlocutory appeal by the State.
The State never requested an extension order pursuant to Rule
3.191(d)(2) (iv). On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, reversed the defendant's convictions and life sentences for
robbery and murder and discharged the defendant.
The requirement of a court order was also applied in Pouncy v.
State."3 There, the defendants were arrested on April 7, 1973. On
July 5, 1973, a hearing was held on the defendant's motion to sup-
the Rule by order of the court (i) upon stipulation, provided the period of time sought to be
extended had not expired at the time the stipulation is signed, (ii) on the court's own motion
or motion by either party in exceptional circumstances, (iii) with good cause shown by the
accused upon waiver by him, or (iv) upon reasonable and necessary delay for proceedings
including, but not limited to, physical or mental examinations, interlocutory appeals, hear-
ings on pretrial motions, and trial or other pending charges by the accused.
Exceptional circumstances contemplated by (d)(2)(ii) are listed in subsection (f) and
include (i) unexpected illness or incapacity or unavoidable absence of a person whose testi-
mony is necessary for the trial, (ii) a showing by the State of unusual complexity requiring
extra investigation or preparation, (iii) a showing by the State that specific evidence is
unavailable despite diligent efforts to secure it, but that it will be available at a later time,
(iv) material unanticipated developments, (v) for accommodation of a co-defendant when
there is reason not to sever, or (vi) when the accused has caused major delay.
179. Subsection (d)(3) provides for continuances and states in part that if the trial does
not commence within the time established a motion for discharge shall be granted unless a
time extension has been ordered within (d)(2) or the delay is due to the unexcused actions or
decisions of the accused or a co-defendant. If due to unexcused actions of the accused the
motion for discharge shall be voidable on motion of the State.
180. 305 So. 2d at 166.
181. Id. at 163.
182. 307 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
183. 296 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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press, which was denied on September 17, 1973. The State argued
that the pre-trial motion extended the time for trial under
3.191(d)(2)(iv). The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held
that an extension under 3.191(d) must be by order of court, and in
the absence of such order the speedy trial time is not extended or
tolled. Defendants were, therefore, discharged. In light of Rubiera
a different result might be possible by arguing unexcused delay
under 3.191(d)(3). Thus defendant might not be entitled to dis-
charge even though no court order is obtained.
The Rubiera and Mullin cases dealt specifically with delays not
pursuant to court order. However, even when the trial court has
entered an order pursuant to Rule 3.191(d)(2), there is controversy
over whether the speedy trial requirements are extended or waived.
The Rule itself provides for both alternatives: "The periods of time
established by this Rule for trial may at any time be waived or
extended by order of the court . . .. "
As might be expected, two distinct lines have developed inter-
preting this provision. In Swanson v. Love,'85 the defendant was
charged with robbery. Upon his motion, the trial date was continued
from June 5 to June 12, 1973. The State subsequently filed a notice
of nolle prosequi but later refiled charging the same crime. The
court held that 3.191(h)(2) meant that the speedy trial period ran
from the date of arrest despite the nolle prosequi. s6 However, the
court also held that the delay due to the continuance was to be
tacked to the 180 days to determine the last permissible trial date.
The court, therefore, remanded for the trial judge to determine ex-
actly how many days were chargeable to the defendant and to ex-
tend the speedy trial date accordingly. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Second District, reiterated this tacking approach in Griffith v.
State.17 Defendant was held chargeable with an 11-day delay
caused by continuances. The court held that the 11 days must be
added to 180 days to determine the speedy trial period.
However, in Chester v. State,' the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, found that the delay caused by the defendant
184. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(d)(2).
185. 290 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
186. FLA. R. CaM. P. 3.191(h)(2) states in part: "The intent of this Rule shall not be
avoided by the State by entering a nolle prosequi to a crime charged and by prosecuting a
new crime grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode .
187. 299 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
188. 298 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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amounted to a waiver of the speedy trial requirement. Defendant
was charged with murder in the first degree. One hundred days after
his arrest the court granted a motion for a psychiatric evaluation at
defendant's request. The evaluation extended 93 days because of
the defendant's non-cooperation. One hundred forty-eight days
after the evaluation period was over, the defendant filed a motion
to discharge which was denied. After additional delay, the trial was
held 281 days after arrest, exclusive of the evaluation period. The
court looked to Rule 3.191(d)(3)(i) and the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida decision in State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen' to determine that the
defendant had waived the rule and therefore the 180-day limit no
longer applied. The court further found that delay had not deprived
the defendant of a speedy trial under constitutional standards. 90
The dissent pointed out that the psychiatric evaluation was court
ordered, and, therefore, was an excused delay under 3.191(d)(2)(iv)
rather than an unexcused delay under 3.191(d)(3) and urged a
finding of extension rather than waiver."' Similarly, the court in
Davis v. State' held that a defense continuance had the effect of
making the speedy trial rule inapplicable and that the trial court
had the authority to set the trial date within a reasonable time.
It is submitted that Rubiera does not resolve this issue, al-
though dicta in that decision seems to support the extension theory.
"Such delays [3.191(d)(2)] are 'excused' with the qualification that
a court order extending time has been entered."" 3
As previously mentioned, under Rule 3.191(d)(2) and (f) the
court may order an extension of time if exceptional circumstances
exist. "'4 The rule expressly indicates that general congestion of the
court's docket, lack of diligent preparation, failure to obtain avail-
able witnesses, and other foreseeable delays are not exceptional cir-
189. 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971). In Cullen the supreme court held that where a continu-
ance was requested by defendants, and granted, "the time limitations in the rule were no
longer applicable and the Court had the right and authority to set the case for trial within a
reasonable time." Id at 863.
190. 298 So. 2d at 531. In determining that defendant had not been denied his constitu-.
tional right to a speedy trial, the court cited Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and listed
the four factors to be considered in assessing whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial
has been denied. These are: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defen-
dant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.
191. 298 So. 2d at 532-33.
192. 302 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
193. 305 So. 2d at 163.
194. See note 178 supra.
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cumstances. The procedural facts in Riggins v. State9 ' are illustra-
tive of the questions facing the courts in determining whether or not
a trial is "speedy." In Riggins the total time between arrest and trial
was approximately 280 days. The District Court of Appeal, First
District, considered that the initial delay was caused by the discov-
ery that Riggins was a minor. However, the court found that the
State's burden under 3.191(f) to show exceptional circumstances
was not met since the record reflected no reason why the defendant's
age was not discovered for 7 months. Furthermore, the delay after
a guardian ad litem was appointed was not supported by any reason.
The court also held that even if there had been justifiable reasons
for delaying the minor's trial, this delay would not be justified as
to co-defendant McGill unless the State had shown there was reason
not to sever as required by 3.191(f)(v). Both defendants were dis-
charged.
The issue of what constitutes exigent circumstances which toll
the running of the rule under 3.191(f) was considered in Crain v.
State.' Marijuana seized from the defendant was not identified as
such until a month after his arrest. The court held that this was not
an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of the rule. A Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District, decision'97 indicated the type
of exceptional circumstances covered by 3.191(f). Defendant's case
was set for trial 173 days after arrest. The State moved for a continu-
ance pursuant to 3.191(f) on the grounds that the State's chief wit-
ness, a police officer, was hospitalized and would require 30 days to
recuperate. The trial court granted the continuance and a 30-day
extension. The trial was held 132 days after this hearing. The Third
District held that the trial court reasonably followed the provision
of Rule 3.191(f): "Under the foregoing circumstances the court may
set a new trial within a reasonable time.""'9 Once the trial judge
granted the state an exceptional circumstances continuance, the
195. 301 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974). Riggins and a co-defendant, McGill, were
arrested on May 24, 1972, and informed against on July 12, 1972. On August 24, 1972, both
defendants requested psychological evaluations. Riggins was evaluated on September 14,
1972 and McGill on October 5, 1972. When the case was called for trial on December 11, 1972,
it came to the court's attention that Riggins was a minor. A guardian ad litem was appointed
January 15, 1973. Trial was held March 5, 1973.
196. 302 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
197. King v. State, 303 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
198. Id. at 391. Rule 3.191(f) sets forth various circumstances under which a new trial
can be set within a reasonable time. Circumstances other than those enumerated may also
allow the court to set a date within a reasonable time.
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quantitative provision of the rule was no longer applicable. The
defendant's right to speedy trial then was measured by constitu-
tional standards. The court expressly rejected any time-tacking pro-
cedure.
2. SPEEDY TRIAL UPON DEMAND
Rule 3.191 also provides for a speedy trial upon the demand of
the defendant in subsection (a)(2). After filing a demand, the defen-
dant must be brought to trial within 60 days unless the State is
granted a continuance due to exceptional circumstances. Rule
3.191(c) places certain restrictions on the demand: "A demand for
a speedy trial shall be deemed a pleading by the accused that he is
available for trial, has diligently investigated his case, and that he
is prepared or will be prepared for trial." Both the State and the
defendant are bound by the demand and defense continuances can
be granted only with the consent of the State or upon a showing of
good cause.
Prior to the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida set
down further guidelines for demanding a speedy trial. In State ex
rel. Hanks v. Goodman,' the court required trial judges to deter-
mine whether the defendant had a bona fide desire to obtain an
early trial and whether defendant was prepared for trial. If these
requirements were not met the demand would be stricken as null
and void. In Turner v. State,'"" the court found the demand spurious
when the defendant subsequently moved to compel disclosure of
favorable evidence and to depose witnesses.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, applied these
tests in Embry v. State,'' and held that the mere filing of a motion
to suppress after filing a demand did not render the demand invalid.
Every preparatory act after demand does not invalidate the de-
mand, and the court will consider the nature of the act in determin-
ing whether the demand is actually bona fide.
The court may refuse to grant a defense continuance after a
speedy trial demand has been made under the provisions of the
199. 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971). In this case the accused had filed his demand for a speedy
trial before he was charged with the crime. The court held that under the present rule the
accused cannot control the criminal docket by filing demands for a trial for which he is not
in fact prepared.
200. 272 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1973).
201. 300 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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rule.2"2 The trial court in Rembert v. State'" denied such continu-
ance based on a previous demand. However, the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, held that the denial was erroneous because
the demand was void, having been made before the information was
filed against the defendant.
The question of an untimely demand was raised in State v.
Hill.2 4 Defendant, an indigent, prepared a hand written motion for
speedy trial the day after he was arrested. A week later the State
filed the information. After 60 days had passed, the defendant peti-
tioned for discharge which the court granted. The District Court of
Appeal, First District, said that if this was a new question they
would decide that any prior demand for speedy trial would become
effective upon the filing of the information. But in light of supreme
court cases2' 5 holding such a demand to be void, the court found the
defendant's motion ineffective as a demand for a speedy trial. How-
ever, while holding that the trial court erred insofar as it construed
the motion for a speedy trial to have been timely, the court con-
strued the motion for discharge as a petition for habeas corpus and
affirmed the discharge.
3. PRISONER'S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
Further provisions of Rule 3.191 provide special guidelines for
defendants who are already imprisoned. The supreme court sus-
tained the validity of Rule 3.191(b)(1) °5 in State v. Lott.' 7 The
circuit court, upon defendant's motion, had discharged the defen-
dant because 180 days had passed since his arrest. During this pe-
riod, defendant had been incarcerated in another county. The trial
court found the rule unconstitutional in that it denied the defendant
equal protection because of this status as a prisoner, and further
202. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(c).
203. 284 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
204. 299 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st Dist.1974).
205. State v. Gravlee, 276 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1973); State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So.
2d 861 (Fla. 1971); State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1971).
206. Rule 3.191(b)(1) provides that a prisoner in the State of Florida is entitled, without
demand, to be brought to trial within 1 year if the crime charged is a misdemeanor or non-
violent felony and within 2 years if the crime is a violent felony or a capital crime. The time
commences when the person is taken into custody as a result of the subject crime or when
the charge is filed whichever is earlier. Rule 3.191(b)(2) provides that a prisoner who demands
a speedy trial must be tried within 6 months of the demand.
207. 286 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1973).
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
stated that the Supreme Court of Florida had abused its discretion
with regard to its rulemaking power by granting the State an addi-
tional 6 months to try a defendant who is confined in a state prison.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court was bound
by the rule and had erred in finding the rule unconstitutional. The
court further examined decisions of the United States Supreme
Court"" and found that the rule met the standard set down by that
Court. The court concluded that 3.191(b)(1) insured speedy trial
rights of prisoners rather than derogating therefrom, especially in
light of Rule 3.191(b)(2) which provides for a 6-month speedy trial
on demand. In dissent, Justices Ervin and McCain, found that the
difference in the rule regarding prisoners had no rational basis, and
denied them equal protection.""9
The right to trial within 1 year applies only to a prisoner who
is imprisoned in a penal or correctional institution in the State of
Florida or a subdivision thereof."" Therefore, the defendant's right
to trial within 1 year begins to run from the date he is incarcerated
in Florida, even if he was previously detained elsewhere on the same
charge.
4. OTHER ASPECTS OF RULE 3.191
Rule 3.191(h)(2) specifically provides that the State cannot
avoid speedy trial requirements by filing a nolle prosequi to a charge
and prosecuting a new crime based on the same event or conduct.
In Crain v. State,"' the defendant was arrested and charged with
driving while under the influence of a prohibited drug. The defend-
ant was charged 1 month later with a misdemeanor of possession of
marijuana after the State received lab reports. A nolle prosequi was
entered and the State filed a new information charging felony mari-
juana possession. A total of 206 days elapsed between the initial
arrest and the trial. The District Court of Appeal, Second District,
held that the applicable speedy trial limit was 180 days regardless
of the original misdemeanor charge. This time period commenced
upon the initial arrest since that was when the defendant was taken
208. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966);
Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
209. 286 So. 2d at 568.
210. Perez v. State, 283 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
211. 302 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); accord, Gue v. State, 297 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1974); State ex rel. Green v. Patterson, 279 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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into custody for the conduct giving rise to the felony charge.
If a defendant is to be tried again as a result of a mistrial, the
granting of a new trial, an arrest of judgment, or remand from an
appellate court, Rule 3.191(g) requires that he be brought to trial
within 90 days. Any waiver of this provision must be in the form of
a stipulation signed by the defendant or counsel."'
Rule 3.191 applies only to defendants charged "with a crime by
indictment or information." Therefore, prosecutions in metropoli-
tan courts for traffic offenses have been held not to fall within the
speedy trial requirement,213 even if the case was transferred to
county court for a jury trial.2"4 Another case 5 found that when a
traffic case was transferred to county court, the speedy trial require-
ments applied although the time period ran from the date of actual
docketing, not the date of arrest. The Supreme Court of Florida has
resolved the question by amending Florida Traffic Court Rule 6.13
so as to include Rule 3.191 and make it applicable to traffic
offenses."
B. Conduct of the State Attorney
It is well settled law that counsel has wide latitude in making
a final argument to the jury."7 However, in criminal prosecutions
the conduct of the state attorney must be examined in light of the
prejudicial effect likely to be had upon the jury. The State attor-
ney is not an attorney striving for a conviction at any cost. "He is a
quasi-judicial officer whose main objective should always be to
212. State ex rel. Williams v. Cowart, 281 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
213. State v. Jones, 285 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
214. Castaneda v. Conser, 292 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
215. State v. Hendricks, 309 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
216. In re Rule 6.13, Fla. Traffic Court Rules, 287 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1974). FLA. STAT. ch.
316, however, has been recently amended. Section 316.026 now provides that a violation of
Chapter 316 "shall be deemed an infraction" as defined in section 318.13(3), with the excep-
tion of the offenses enumerated in 316.026(4). These exceptions include: section 316.019
(fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer); sections 316.027 and 316.061 (leaving the
scene of an accident); section 316.028 (driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs); section
316.029 (reckless driving); and section 316.067 (giving a false report). Section 318.13(3) de-
fines an infraction as a "noncriminal violation which is not punishable by incarceration, and
for which there is no right to a trial by jury or a right to court appointed counsel." The
procedure for dealing with infractions is prescribed in section 318.14. In view of the above, it
would seem that the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure would not apply to traffic offenses
except those excepted by 316.026(4). See FLA. STAT. chs. 316 and 318 (1975).
217. Flicker v. State, 296 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), citing Lovell v. Henry, 212 So.
2d 67 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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serve justice and see that every defendant receive[s] a fair trial. 218
Therefore, in Wilson v. State,'2 1 the Supreme Court of Florida
found that the remarks of the prosecutor were so prejudicial to the
defendant that the entire proceeding was tainted. Defendant had
been indicted for the murder of her husband and had been found
not guilty at trial. Six months later defendant was charged with
perjury arising out of her testimony at the murder trial. During the
closing argument at the perjury trial the prosecutor alluded to the
murder of defendant's husband 16 times and directly accused her
of murder 3 times. He also accused her of adultery and bigamy,
felonies with which she was never charged. The court found the trial
so permeated with immaterial and fatally prejudical remarks that
the conviction was reversed, despite the fact that defense had not
objected to every impermissible reference. Similarly, the District
Court of Appeal, First District, in Flicker v. State, 2 found that the
State attorney had exceeded permissible grounds in closing argu-
ment. The prosecutor stated to the jury that he had voluntarily
dismissed count I as there was insufficient evidence, thus possibly
leading the jury to believe there must have been adequate evidence
on the other counts. Count I had in fact been dismissed by the court
as a result of a motion for a directed verdict. The court reversed the
convictions on all other counts, finding the entire trial tainted. The
court also noted the aggravating effect of the trial judge's remark
that the dismissal had been suggested by the court, "and the state
went along with it. '2 2'
The proper procedure for the defense to follow where improper
comments are made by the prosecutor was set down in Mabery v.
State.2 12 The State attorney stated to the jury that if the defendant
testified as to something that could be questioned, he should have
brought witnesses to testify in his behalf. The defense asked for a
mistrial which was denied. The court found that the remark was
improper but not prejudicial. Where the remark is not in itself in-
flammatory the proper recourse is to object and move for corrective
instructions. If the motion for corrective instructions is denied, is
inadequate, or if the offense is repeated the remedy is a mistrial.
218. Frazier v. State, 294 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), citing Washington v.
State, 86 Fla. 533, 542-43, 98 So. 605, 609 (1923).
219. 294 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1974).
220. 296 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
221. Id. at 113.
222. 303 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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The court will consider the improper remarks within the con-
text of the entire trial to determine if there was prejudice to the
defendant. In Arline v. State13 the prosecutor remarked that in his
heart he believed the defendant to be guilty and urged the jury to
find likewise. The court found the remark improper, but in light of
the totality of the final argument and the evidence presented, not
so prejudicial as to require reversal.
It is well settled that a prosecutor may not directly or indirectly
comment on a defendant's failure to testify.224 Some confusion has
arisen, however, as to whether the prosecutor may comment on a
defendant's failure to testify on some aspects of the case when he
has testified about other aspects of the case. Originally, in Sykes v.
State,"' the Supreme Court of Florida had taken the position that
such comments would constitute reversible error. Later, in Odom v.
State,22" the supreme court receded from Sykes and held that once
a defendant chooses to take the stand the prosecutor is entitled to
comment on his failure to testify about any aspect of the case.
However, in Singleton v. State,227 the District Court of Appeal, Sec-
ond District, apparently unaware of the Odom decision, cited Sykes
as representing the state of the law on this issue. However, the same
court, in Craft v. State,22 receded from its earlier holding and fol-
lowed Odom. Notwithstanding the impropriety of a prosecutor's
comment, however, a failure by the defense to object thereto, will
foreclose that issue on appeal; and it is immaterial whether the
improper comments were made during final argument or voir dire.29
C. Former Jeopardy
Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution guarantees that
"[n]o person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense . . . ." This provision is implemented by Florida Statute
910.11.230
223. 303 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
224. See Britt v. State, 301 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), and cases cited therein.
225. 78 Fla. 167, 82 So. 778 (1919).
226. 109 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1959).
227. 183 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
228. 300 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
229. Britt v. State, 301 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
230. FLA. STAT. § 910.11 (1973).
Conviction or acquittal bar to prosecution
(1) No person shall be held to answer on a second indictment, information, or
affidavit for an offense for which he has been acquitted. The acquittal shall be a
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The proper method for raising the defense of former jeopardy
is a motion to dismiss pursuant to 3.190(b) and (c)(2) Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Failure to raise the issue during trial consti-
tutes a waiver of the defense. 231 The general rule which Florida fol-
lows is that a plea of guilty entered in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion to a valid criminal charge will bar further prosecution for offen-
ses based on the same transaction.2
2
In Troupe v. Rowe 33 the defendant entered a plea of guilty after
plea bargaining between defendant's attorney and the state attor-
ney. Defendant urged the court for a "finding" of guilt rather than
an adjudication, which would allow him to return to the Army. Over
the State's objection, the judge accepted the plea, entered a "find-
ing" of guilt, and sentenced the defendant. After a recess the State
returned and again asked for an adjudication of guilt. The judge set
aside the sentence and set a new trial date. Hearing the case on
conflict certiorari after the district court had denied a writ of prohi-
bition, the supreme court held that jeopardy had attached and the
sentence could not be changed since the state attorney's request to
change would amount to an increase in the sentence. The court
restated its prior holding that any modification of a sentence is
subject to the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Two similar cases during this survey period involved guilty
pleas in county court and subsequent attempts to prosecute in cir-
cuit court for an offense arising out of the same act. In State ex rel.
Miller v. Patterson 21 the court found that the defendant had in fact
pled to a misdemeanor which was a lesser included offense of the
felony later charged. Upon entering his plea, the defendant was
placed in jeopardy and the State was precluded from prosecuting on
a higher degree of the same offense. The District Court of Appeal,
First District, adopted the reasoning of State ex rel. Miller in State
ex rel. Seal v. Shepard.2 3' The court further pointed out that it
bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, notwithstanding any defect
in the form or circumstances of the indictment, information, or affidavit.
(2) When a person may be tried for an offense in two or more counties, a convic-
tion or acquittal in one county shall be a bar to prosecution for the same offense
in another county.
231. Johnson v. State, 299 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
232. Troupe v. Rowe, 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1973), citing Ray v. State, 231 So. 2d 813 (Fla.
1969).
233. 283 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1973).
234. 284 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
235. 299 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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would be manifestly unfair for the State attorney to participate in
plea negotiations in county court and later assert that the county
court had no jurisdication and that, therefore, jeopardy could not
have attached. It should be noted that in both of these cases, the
county court had jurisdiction over the misdemeanor charges.
Caves v. State3' dealt directly with the issue of the jurisdiction
of the court to accept the guilty plea. Defendant was charged with
assault with intent to commit rape. At a preliminary hearing a
justice of the peace sitting as committing magistrate found probable
cause only as to assault with intent to commit sodomy. Since this
statute had been declared unconstitutional 27 the justice of the peace
entered a finding of probable cause on a charge of lewd and lasci-
vious conduct. Defendant entered a guilty plea to this charge. The
District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that a subsequent
prosecution pursuant to an information charging assault with intent
to commit rape was not barred by former jeopardy because the
justice of the peace had no jurisdiction to accept the defendant's
guilty plea. Justices of the peace have no statutory jurisdiction to
try felony cases, nor authority to reduce the felony charges alleged
in the complaint, and therefore, have no power to accept a plea
where the crime originally charged is a felony.
In State v. Beamon,211 defendant was charged with a burglary
occurring on November 26. In the bill of particulars filed by the
State, the date alleged was November 24. At trial the victim testi-
fied as to the later date and the judge granted a judgment of ac-
quittal. The State filed a second information charging defendant
with the same crime committed on the 26th and amended the bill
of particulars to conform. The trial judge had dismissed the charge
on the ground that the defendant had previously been placed in
jeopardy for the same offense. The District Court of Appeal, Third
District, had affirmed, applying a four-step test:
The test to sustain a plea of former jeopardy is that it must be
made to appear that (1) there was a former prosecution in the
same state for the same offense; (2) that the same person was in
jeopardy on the first prosecution; (3) that the parties are identical
in the same prosecution; and (4) that the particular offense on the
236. 303 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
237. Former FLA. STAT. § 800.01 was declared unconstitutional as overbroad in Franklin
v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971).
238. 298 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1974).
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prosecution of which the jeopardy attached was such an offense
as to constitute a bar.2 39
The court found that the State was attempting to prosecute the
defendant under the second information on a charge for which he
was acquitted. They found that the change of dates did not alter the
crime charged. On certiorari the Supreme Court of Florida quashed
the Third District's decision and found that there was no former
jeopardy bar. Applying the same test, the supreme court deter-
mined that the defendant had not been prosecuted before for the
same offense. The first information as limited by the bill of particu-
lars charged a different and distinct offense from the second infor-
mation because the dates were different. As the court pointed out:
The defendant is estopped by virtue of his inconsistent positions
in first claiming as a basis for acquittal the materiality of the date
and then contending on the new information that the actual,
different date of the alleged offense is immaterial now, so that
whatever the date of the alleged offense he was acquitted of it in
the first trial. (emphasis in original). 4 '
In a prosecution for possession of narcotics, the defendant in
Camp v. State24' filed a sworn motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
3.190(c)(4) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, contending
that he did not have knowledge that narcotics were on his premises.
The State failed to file a traverse, and under Florida Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 3.190(d) defendant's allegations were admitted and
established a valid defense.2 2 The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, reversed the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss, not-
ing, however, that the dismissal would not bar subsequent prosecu-
tion under the authority of State v. Giesy.2 43
D. Jury
The law is well-settled in Florida that a criminal defendant has
239. 302 So. 2d 208, 209-10 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
240. 298 So. 2d at 378.
241. 293 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
242. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190 (d) provides that the State may traverse or demur to a motion
to dismiss which alleges factual matters, and such matters shall be deemed admitted unless
specifically denied by the State in such traverse.
243. 243 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). The Author's Comment to Rule 3.190 also




the right peremptorily to challenge a juror at any time before the
jury is sworn."' Thus, it is reversible error for a trial judge to deny
a peremptory challenge to one of the veniremen previously seated
in the jury box but not yet sworn. This principle was followed in
Shelby v. State.4 ' The jury panel was picked, tendered, and ac-
cepted, and several days later was called to the box for the trial. The
District Court of Appeal, First District, found that it was error to
refuse the defendant peremptory challenges at that point because
the jury was not yet sworn. To answer the question the court referred
to the 1860 case of O'Connor v. State4 ' which held the right to
challenge absolute before the juror is sworn. The court concluded
nothing had changed that right.
In Bocanegra v. State247 the defendant challenged the court's
procedure of swearing each juror individually before the full panel
was selected. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, found
no error in the instant case, but indicated that the better practice
is to postpone swearing until the full panel is selected.
Rule 3.280 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
that once the jury retires to consider the verdict, any alternate jurors
must be discharged. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
found there was fundamental reversible error in allowing an alter-
nate to accompany the jury during deliberations, although the alter-
nate did not participate in any discussion."' The court stated that
anything less than private and secret jury deliberation infringes on
the defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury. In contrast, the
court in Ennis v. State249 found it to be harmless error for the bailiff
to answer jurors' questions regarding testimony given at the trial
after deliberations had begun.
During the survey period section 40.01 of the Florida Statutes
(1973), relating to qualification and disqualification of jurors, was
upheld by the supreme court in the face of numerous challenges.'"
244. Knee v. State, 294 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), citing Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702,
6 So. 768 (1889); Kennick v. State, 107 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.310.
245. 301 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
246. 9 Fla. 215 (1860).
247. 303 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974), citing King v. State, 125 Fla. 316, 169 So. 747
(1936).
248. Berry v. State, 298 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
249. 300 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
250. Wilson v. State, 306 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1975); Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 385 (Fla.
1975); Slaughter v. State, 301 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1974); Reed v. State, 292 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1974).
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E. Defenses
1. ALIBI
Rule 3.200 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that upon demand by the State, one intending to claim an alibi
must supply specific information with respect thereto and give the
names and addresses of witnesses who will be called to prove the
alibi. If notice is given, the court may, in its discretion, exclude an
alibi witness whose name is not on the notice. In Bell v. State25 the
defense had served notice of alibi and listed witnesses. Just prior to
trial the defendant informed his counsel that one of the State's
witnesses could support the alibi. The trial court refused to allow
the testimony. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, re-
versed, noting that the rule itself allows waiving the requirements
if good cause is shown. In view of the fact that the witness was called
by the State, there was no compelling reason to exclude the testi-
mony.
Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding noncompliance
with the rule should be conducted before excluding a witness from
testifying. The court in Barnes v. State252 reached this conclusion
following the reasoning in cases construing Rule 3.220 of the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 53 The case was remanded for a hearing
to determine if good cause had been shown. In Shelby v. State254 the
defendant filed his notice of alibi 2 days before trial. The District
Court of Appeal, First District, held the trial court erred in exclud-
ing the alibi witnesses because any noncompliance by the defend-
ant was the result of the State's delay in making the demand. The
State had made the demand only 7 days prior to trial, thus frustrat-
ing the defendant's ability to provide the list 10 days before trial as
required. These cases indicate the prevalent view that Rule 3.200 is
to be applied reasonably with the primary objective to insure defen-
dant a fair trial. 55
251. 287 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
252. 294 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
253. Rule 3.220 deals with discovery, and the court seemed to feel that cases construing
this rule were analogous to the present situation.
254. 301 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).




Rule 3.210 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
basic guidelines for the determination of a defendant's sanity. If a
defendant wishes to rely on a defense of insanity, he must notify the
court of his intent to use the defense of insanity and enter a plea of
not guilty."' 6 The rule also provides for procedures to determine if
the defendant is sane at the time of the trial. ' The rule is well
settled in Florida that all persons are presumed to be sane. 5 ' How-
ever, this presumption vanishes when sufficient testimony is pre-
sented to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity.
The burden at that point is on the State to prove sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt. In Byrd v. State5 ' the defense produced two
psychiatrists who testified as to the insanity of the defendant at the
time of the offense. On rebuttal, the State produced two lay wit-
nesses. Defendant contended that the trial court erred in refusing
to direct a judgment of acquittal. The supreme court sustained
defendant's conviction reiterating the principle that the question of
a defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury. The jury does not necessarily have to believe
expert testimony over non-expert testimony.
When a defendant has been adjudicated incompetent prior to
the time of the crime charged, his plea of insanity places the burden
on the State to show he was sane when the crime was committed to
the exclusion of every reasonable doubt." The District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that Rule 3.210 requires the court to
enter a written order determining that defendant was competent to
stand trial.26" '
The defendant in Turner v. State2 62 attacked the validity of the
"M'Naghten Rule. 2  The District Court of Appeal, First District,
256. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210 (b), Author's Comments. See also FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.170(a).
257. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(a).
258. Byrd v. State, 297 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1974), citing Farrell v. State, 101 So. 2d 130 (Fla.
1958).
259. 297 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1974).
260. Emerson v. State, 294 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
261. Id.
262. 297 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
263. The "M'Naghten Rule" or "right wrong" test states essentially, that if the accused
was possessed of sufficient understanding when he committed the act to know the nature and
quality of the act, and knew it was wrong, he is criminally responsible therefor. However, if
he did not know the nature and quality of the act, or even if he did know the nature and
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upheld the use of a standard jury instruction which embraces the
requirement of the M'Naghten Rule, relying on the Supreme Court
of Florida's consistent validation of this "right or wrong" test to
determine sanity.2"4 This same test was again upheld by the su-
preme court in Walker v. State,26 where the court held that it was
within the province of a jury to determine defendant's ability to
distinguish right from wrong at the time of the crime. However, the
court also held that the implementation of the M'Naghten test did
not affect the trial judge's authority to make an independent deter-
mination of the defendant's mental condition at the time of sentenc-
ing. The intent of the rules relating to the determination of sanity
at the time of sentencing is that no insane person shall be incar-
cerated and thereby denied mental treatment. Therefore, defend-
ant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the question of sanity
for sentencing purposes. 8
The supreme court considered the scope of the questions which
could be asked of a psychiatrist called by the defendant in Roseman
v. State.67 Defendant called two psychiatrists and elicited in detail
all the facts and circumstances leading up, to and including the
crime. The court held that there was a proper foundation for the
State to call other psychiatrists to testify to the facts surrounding
the crime as told to them by the defendant. The court rejected the
defendant's arguments that his right against self-incrimination was
violated by the testimony of the state psychiatrist. The court dis-
tinguished this case from McMunn v. State"'5 where the District
Court of Appeal, First District, had found that testimony concern-
ing facts told the psychiatrist was inadmissible on the grounds that
in McMunn the defendant had objected to the testimony while in
this case he had not.
3. OTHER DEFENSES
Self-defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance where
quality of the act, if he did not know it was wrong, he is not criminally responsible therefor.
Hixon v. State, 165 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). This test was adopted by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (Fla. 1902).
264. Anderson v. State, 276 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973).
265. 296 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1974).
266. Id. at 31. On petition for rehearing the supreme court determined such a hearing
had been held. Id.
267. 293 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1974).
268. 264 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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the defendant admits the act and seeks to establish facts constitut-
ing excuse or justification. The defendant who relies on self-defense
has the burden of going forward with the evidence. The burden,
however, does not require a jury instruction on the burden of self-
defense. 69 The defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the legal
requirements of self-defense when he relies upon such a defense. In
Taylor v. State"" the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held
it was error for the trial judge to refuse to recognize the defense and
to so instruct. No matter how weak or improbable was defendant's
testimony, self-defense was a question for the jury to decide after
proper instruction.
The Florida courts continue to apply the general rule that a
defense of entrapment is available only where a person charged with
a crime had no intention of committing it but for the inducement,
enticement, or instigation of an officer of law.27" ' This defense is
therefore extremely limited in scope.
The Florida statute of limitations requires prosecution of of-
fenses not punishable by death to commence within 2 years of the
offense. In State v. King27 the supreme court considered a certified
question as to when the statute of limitations begins to run in a
larceny case. The crime of larceny was determined to be complete
upon the taking, and the statute of limitations in Florida runs from
that date. The court refused to create an exception to the statute
for continuing, discoverable offenses, stating "[i]f this is a 'loop-
hole' that should be closed, we must turn to the legislature to do
so."27' An unusual question regarding the statute of limitations arose
as a result of Furman v. Georgia.74 Prior to that decision a capital
crime could be prosecuted at any time. Defendants urged that their
prosecutions were barred by the 2-year statute of limitations since
the offenses charged were no longer capital.7 ' The supreme court
rejected this argument, holding that because the crimes were com-
269. Bolin v. State, 297 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
270. 301 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
271. English v. State, 301 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Davis v. State, 302 So. 2d 464
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
272. 282 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1973).
273. Id. at 167.
274. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
275. The death penalty was reestablished in 1972 and is codified as FLA. STAT. § 921.141
(1975).
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mitted prior to Furman and because the statute of limitations is
substantive, the 2-year limit was not applicable.276
F. Jury Instructions
1. INSTRUCTIONS ON PENALTIES
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a) requires, inter alia,
that the presiding judge "must include in said charge the penalty
fixed by law for the offense for which the accused is then on trial."
This has been a statutory requirement in Florida since 1945.277 How-
ever, during this survey period there were conflicting decisions as to
whether this rule is discretionary or mandatory. In Johnson v.
State,7' the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that the
rule permits the exercise of discretion as to whether to charge on the
penalty. This decision was based on a 1948 Supreme Court of Flor-
ida decision, Simmons v. State,27 which held that such a charge was
discretionary. While following Simmons, the district court recog-
nized a conflict with the wording of Rule 3.390(a), promulgated by
the Supreme Court of Florida in 1967, and certified the question as
a matter of great public interest to the supreme court. The District
Court of Appeal, First District, considered the same issue in Terry
v. State"'° and held that the rule was mandatory and required giving
the requested charge. The court considered the Johnson decision
and certified the question to the supreme court.
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved the question in Johnson
v. State"1 by holding that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.390(a) is discretionary. The court relied on Simmons v. State2"2
even though that case primarily dealt with a legislative attempt to
infringe on the trial court's judicial function. The court referred also
to the language of standard jury instructions in criminal cases sec-
tion 2.1483 which instructs that a jury is not to be concerned with
the penalty which might be imposed. Also, in Settle v. State,"4 it
276. State ex rel. Manucy v. Wadsworth, 293 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1974).
277. Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 22775 § 1.
278. 297 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
279. 160 Fla. 626, 36 So. 2d 207 (1948). This case was based on lack of legislative author-
ity to promulgate rules for courts.
280. 302 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
281. 308 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1974).
282. 160 Fla. 626, 36 So. 2d 207 (1948). See note 278 and accompanying text.
283. As validated by FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.985.
284. 288 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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was held that the trial judge is not required to inform the jury of
the punishment for any of the lesser included offenses other than the
one charged, although the defendant may be convicted of one of
these lesser offenses.
2. INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
The need for jury instructions on lesser included offenses con-
tinues to be a controversial issue in Florida appellate courts. Rule
3.510 of Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that:
Upon an indictment or information upon which the defendant is
to be tried for any offense, the jurors may convict the defendant
of an attempt to commit such offense if such attempt is an of-
fense, or may convict him of any offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The court shall charge the jury
in this regard.
The Supreme Court of Florida had, prior to the survey period,
ruled that jury instructions on lesser included offenses were manda-
tory.285 The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reaffirmed
this mandate in two recent cases. In Ward v. State28 the court found
reversible error where the trial court refused to instruct the jury on
an attempt to commit the crime charged where the attempt was also
a crime. The trial court had refused to so instruct due to the weight
of the evidence presented. The appellate court found that "it makes
no difference that the proof established the greater crime charged
.. . "2 Similarly, in Bracy v. State8 the court held that it was
error to refuse to charge the jury on attempt and lesser included
offenses regardless of the trial court's conclusion about the evidence.
"Such instructions must be given even though it is the opinion of
the trial court that the proofs clearly establish the crime charged." '89
In Wilcox v. State,9" however, the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, departed slightly from the mandate of Rule 3.510.
It was held to be harmless error not to charge the jury on a lesser
offense of simple assault in a robbery prosecution. The court found
285. Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968); accord, Raynor v. State, 273 So. 2d 759
(Fla. 1973); State v. Washington, 268 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1972).
286. 287 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
287. Id. at 139.
288. 299 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
289. Id. at 126.
290. 299 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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this harmless because instructions were given on four other lesser
included offenses. It was also held harmless error not to give a
requested instruction on the lesser included offense of assault in a
prosecution for robbery in Stephens v. State."9 ' The error was harm-
less in view of the overwhelming evidence to support the jury's
verdict.
A somewhat different situation was presented in Gilford v.
State."'2 There the defendant was charged with breaking and enter-
ing with intent to commit a felony, and was convicted and sent-
enced. On appeal, defendant claimed the trial court erred in not
instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of breaking and
entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, to wit: petit larceny.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed the trial
court because there was absolutely no evidence whatsoever to indi-
cate that the value of the stolen property was less than $100. This
led the court to conclude that the error asserted, if any, was harm-
less. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida went further and
held that there was no error in not instructing the jury on the lesser
offense. '3 The trial court need only instruct on lesser offenses where
there is evidence that the lesser included offense has been commit-
ted. If there is no such evidence no jury charge is necessary.
In reaching this conclusion the court discussed the Brown deci-
sion.294 The court said that in Brown the particular holding was that
the proof of the lesser offense " 'necessarily' was shown by proof of
the greater." The court gave the example of armed robbery which
also proves an assault, and indicated in this situation an instruction
must be given. In that situation proof of the assault inheres in proof
of the armed robbery. The court went on to say, however, that proof
of the greater offense is not always proof of the lesser. This was the
situation in Gilford. On the facts in Gilford, the only proof was that
the value of the property taken was $600; and there was no way that
this could be reduced to less than $100, the market value necessary
to include the lesser offense of petty larceny. The court added that
Rule 3.510 does not change this result. The court said the rule was
drafted in the context of existing law which requires proof for a
291. 279 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
292. 281 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), aff'd, 313 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1975).
293. Gilford v. State, 313 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1975).
294. See note 285 supra and accompanying text.
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conviction. Here there was no proof to support a conviction for the
lesser offense. 95
3. INSTRUCTIONS ON CRIMES DIVISIBLE INTO DEGREES
After retiring in a murder trial, the jury requested that the
court re-read the charge regarding second degree murder, self-
defense, and manslaughter. The court re-read these charges, but
refused to repeat a charge on excusable homicide which the defend-
ant had requested. The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
reversed the defendant's conviction of manslaughter on the grounds
that the jury was left with incomplete and possibly misleading in-
structions.29 Similarly, in Clark v. State297 the court based its deci-
sion on "the clear language of [Fla. R. Crim. P.] 3.510 [which]
makes an instruction of justifiable and excusable homicide, as part
of the definition of manslaughter, a mandatory requirement," 9 ' and
reversed defendant's second degree murder conviction, where the
judge had failed to re-read all charges including those pertaining to
justifiable and excusable homicide and self defense.
In Dykman v. State29 the jury requested re-instruction on first,
second, and third degree murder and manslaughter. The trial court
gave these instructions but did not re-instruct on excusable and
justifiable homicide. The District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that it was error not to give full instruction, but that the error
was cured when the court recalled the jury 5 minutes later and gave
them the remainder of the requested instructions. There was no
prejudice to the defendant even though the bailiff testified that the
jury had reached a verdict before being recalled because a verdict
is not final until accepted by the court.
4. INSTRUCTIONS INVOLVING THE "ALLEN CHARGE"
In State v. Bryan,3°0 defendant had been convicted of man-
slaughter after a second degree murder prosecution. The jury had
295. Id. at 733.
296. Ford v. State, 292 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), citing Bagley v. State, 119 So. 2d
400 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960); accord, McCormick v. State, 308 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975);
Clark v. State, 301 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
297. 301 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
298. Id. at 457.
299. 300 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
300. 290 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1974).
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deliberated for 5 hours when the court called them in to see if they
were close to reaching a verdict. Since they were not, the judge
delivered an "Allen Charge," urging minority members to reconsi-
der their position to see if they could agree in good conscience with
the majority. After another half hour of deliberation, the jury was
again recalled and given a 20-minute deadline, within which time
they returned with a guilty verdict. The Supreme Court of Florida
found no error in this procedure, reasoning that the charge given was
balanced, urging neither conviction nor acquittal. The court cited
with approval the 1896 United States Supreme Court decision in
Allen v. United States"" which upheld such a charge. They also
referred to standard jury instruction 2.19, which was found to be
materially consistent with the charges actually given. As to the 20-
minute deadline, the court found that this also was not coercive.
The defendant petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief and the
district court vacated his judgment and sentence, holding that the
"Allen Charge" coupled with the deadline was coercive and denied
the defendant his constitutional rights"2 under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.
A similar situation arose in Evans v. State' 3 where the trial
judge gave standard jury instruction 2.19 and told the jury to return
for one more ballot after they had deliberated for over 5 hours.
Within minutes of this so called "Modified Allen Charge" the jury
returned with a verdict of guilty. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, found no error, relying on State v. Bryan'" despite
the fact it was vacated by a federal court.305 The court considered
the federal court decision but found it unpersuasive with regard to
the facts and evidence in Evans.
XIV. POST TRIAL PROCEDURES
A. Pre-Sentence Report
Rule 3.710 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
for a pre-sentence report by the Probation and Parole Commission.
301. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
302. Bryan v. Wainwright, 377 F. Supp. 766 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
303. 303 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
304. 290 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1974).
305. 377 F. Supp. 766. See note 301 supra and accompanying text.
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In all cases in which the court has discretion as to what
sentence may be imposed, the court may refer the case to the
probation and parole commission for investigation and recom-
mendation. No sentence or sentences other than probation shall
be imposed on any defendant found guilty of a first felony offense
or found guilty of a felony while under the age of 18 years, until
after such investigation has first been made and the recommen-
dations of the commission received and considered by the sent-
encing judge.
The Committee Note"'6 points out that the report is discretion-
ary except in two instances: the sentencing of a first felony offender
and the sentencing of a defendant under 18 years of age. Decisions
during this survey period reflect the position of the committee.
In Still v. State' 7 there was nothing in the record on appeal to
indicate that the defendant had been convicted of a prior felony
offense. The court therefore vacated the sentence with instructions
to the trial court to conduct the pre-sentence investigation pursuant
to Rule 3.710. Similarly, in Harden v. State"'8 the District Court of
Appeal, First District, held that a sentence imposed for a first felony
offense was illegal due to the court's failure to receive and consider
a pre-sentence investigation. Failure of defendant's counsel to re-
quest the investigation did not amount to a waiver of the right
because the language of the rule is mandatory. The court clarified
its position on waiver in Mitchum v. State.10 While mere failure to
request a pre-sentence investigation does not constitute a waiver, a
defendant can waive the report. In Kurlin v. State10 the same court
found that defendant waived his right to a report by fleeing the
jurisdiction and thereby making himself unavailable to participate
in the investigation.
Florida Statutes section 921.23 (Supp. 1974) requires a pre-
sentence investigation in all felony cases. The validity of this statute
was challenged in Johnson v. State.3"' The District Court of Appeal,
First District, found the statute in direct conflict with Rule 3.710.
Holding that a pre-sentence investigation is procedural, the court
306. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.710, Committee Notes.
307. 296 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
308. 290 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
309. 292 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1st Dist.1974).
310. 302 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
311. 308 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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found section 921.23 unconstitutional as an infringement on the
rulemaking power of the supreme court insofar as it conflicted with
Rule 3.710.312
Sentencing may be held in abeyance while the trial court awaits
the results of a pre-sentence investigation. The defendant has no
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case after he is




In Florida, where an information contains more than one count,
but each is a facet or phase of the same transaction, only one sent-
ence may be imposed. The sentence imposed should be for the high-
est offense charged." 4 This "single transaction rule" was applied in
numerous cases during the survey period with somewhat varying
results. Crimes held to be facets of the same transaction included:
sale and possession of drugs;31 breaking and entering with intent to
commit the felony of assault with intent to commit rape and assault
with intent to commit rape;31 aggravated assault and assault with
intent to commit a felony;317 and aggravated assault and resisting a
police officer with violence.31
The single transaction issue is most frequently encountered
when a defendant is charged with breaking and entering with intent
to commit grand or petit larceny and with the larceny itself. The
most complete discussion of the issue is found in Edmond v. State."9
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, traced the single
transaction rule back to a 1796 English case, and surveyed all Flor-
ida cases on the subject. The conclusion of this scholarly opinion is
that:
312. FLA. STAT. § 921.231 (1975) made minor changes in the section which was declared
unconstitutional. These changes would not appear to correct the constitutional defect.
313. State v. Sweetmen, 302 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
314. Yost v. State, 243 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), citing Williams v. State, 69 So.
2d 766 (Fla. 1953).
315. Wilson v. State, 293 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Van Aernam v. State, 281 So.
2d 43 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1973).
316. Benson v. State, 301 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
317. Parks v. State, 300 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
318. Moody v. State, 279 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
319. 280 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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For more than a century the Supreme Court of Florida has ad-
hered with constancy, with the single apparent exception of
Steele v. Mayo . . . to the so-called single transaction rule, limit-
ing punishment to the gravest of those several offenses into which
a single criminal episode may be categorized. 20
The Edmond decision produced an abundance of cases in the dis-
trict courts which split over the result. The District Court of Appeal,
Second District, 2 ' consistently followed the rationale of Edmond, as
did the District Court of Appeal, First District. 22 The Fourth Dis-
trict and Third District323 adhered to the view that the offenses of
breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny and
grand larceny are two distinct crimes and do not fall within the two
facets of the same transaction rule. On conflict certiorari324 the su-
preme court settled the issue and agreed with the view that the
offenses are separate and two sentences can properly be imposed.
The supreme court employed the single transaction rule with
regard to a defendant charged with a felony and with the use of a
firearm during the commission of a felony in Cone v. State."' In this
case the court found that the crimes of robbery and use of a firearm
were facets of the same criminal act. The district court of appeal
opinions after Cone are consistent.32
It should be noted that even when the courts find the sentences
illegal, separate convictions for crimes arising out of the same crimi-
nal transaction are generally upheld."7
When a defendant has successfully appealed his conviction,
been retried, and again adjudicated guilty, the court may impose a
more severe sentence as long as the guidelines of North Carolina v.
320. Id. at 450.
321. Baggett v. State, 302 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Austile v. State, 301 So. 2d 30
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Christia v. State, 295 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Davis v. State,
277 So. 2d 300, (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 283 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1973).
322. McHaney v. State, 295 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974); Kirkland v. State, 299 So.
2d 54 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
323. White v. State, 274 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973); State v. Conrad, 243 So. 2d 174
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1971); Pettigrew v. State, 295 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974); Estevez v. State,
290 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
324. Estevez v. State, 313 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1975).
325. 285 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973).
326. Washburn v. State, 303 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Union v. State, 301 So. 2d
458 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Still v. State, 296 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
327. Mendez v. State, 280 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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Pearce32 are followed. Thus in Vidal v. State"' the court correctly
imposed a longer sentence when reopening of the case revealed prior
convictions. The trial court set forth the reasons for the longer sent-
ence as required. The decision in North Carolina v. Pearce will not
be applied retroactively. 3 In Baggett v. State31 the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, had remanded the defendant's case for
the trial court to resentence the defendant on a breaking and enter-
ing charge after finding that the original sentence of 7 years on
breaking and entering and 5 years on grand larceny was erroneous.
On remand the trial court sentenced the defendant to a 12-year
term. The Second District found that the new 12-year term was
within the statutory requirements and was not objectionable as an
improper increase of the original sentence.
Florida Statutes section 921.161 was amended by the Legisla-
ture in 1973 to make allowance of credit for time served mandatory.
In Hollingshead v. State,3 1 the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, held that the defendant was entitled to credit for time served,
even though the credit did not become mandatory until after he was
sentenced. In Manning v. State,133 defendant was found guilty of
manslaughter. The court sentenced him to 15 years and expressly
denied credit for time served prior to sentencing. The District Court
of Appeal, First District, held this to be error, noting that Florida
Statute Section 775.084 (1973), which allows for extending sent-
ences, could not be relied on since the court did not make the re-
quired findings of facts. 34
328. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The Supreme Court was cognizant of potential vindictiveness
by the trial court that was to retry the case. To protect the defendant from the chilling effect
of such actions, the court held that when a trial judge imposes a more severe sentence he must
affirmatively state his reasons for doing so.
329. 300 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
330. Tucker v. State, 286 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), citing Michigan v. Payne,
412 U.S. 47 (1973).
331. 302 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
332. 292 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
333. 299 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
334. FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1973), as amended, FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (Supp. 1974), effec-
tive as amended, July 1, 1975. The amended version of this statute allows the court, after
notice and opportunity to be heard has been given to the parties, to impose extended sent-
ences on subsequent felony offenders after making certain findings enumerated in the stat-
ute. These include findings (a) that imposition of an extended sentence is necessary to protect
the public; (b) that defendant has previously committed a felony or twice been convicted of
a class A misdemeanor since his eighteenth birthday; (c) that the felony for which defendant
is being sentenced was committed within 5 years of the date of the last prior felony or
[Vol. 30:635
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Florida Statutes section 921.161 applies to sentences arrived at
through plea bargaining. After the defendant was sentenced to 8
years he filed a motion to correct sentence to give him credit for time
served. The court denied the motion stating that a consideration of
time served was made when the sentence was given. The District
Court of Appeal, First District, reversed, holding that the statute
requires that the sentence specify the period of time for which credit
was given.335 In Miller v. State33 the defendant urged an interesting
interpretation of the time served statute. Defendant was sentenced
to four 60-day terms to run consecutively. He was credited with 33
days time served to be applied against his total sentence. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, First District, rejected defendant's contention
that the credit should be subtracted from each 60-day sentence.
A defendant is entitled to credit for time served when he is
incarcerated for violation of probation. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth District, in Sharp v. State337 gave the defendant credit
for the period of time spent in jail between the original incarceration
and the time he was placed on probation. The credit for time served
likewise applies to persons whose parole is revoked. Defendant in
Voulo v. Wainwright23 was paroled from the state prison and later
arrested and sentenced on a new charge. His parole was subse-
quently revoked. The court held that the defendant was entitled to
credit for time served dating from his arrest. This credit was to be
applied to both the new sentence and the original sentence. Simi-
larly, in Kelley v. Wainwright33 the supreme court held that a paro-
lee was entitled to credit against his initial sentence for time spent
in jail after his arrest and before his transfer to the state prison after
revocation of parole. However, when a defendant's parole is revoked,
misdemeanor; (d) that the defendant has not been pardoned on the ground of innocence for
any offense necessary for the operation of this section; (e) that conviction of an offense
necessary to the operation of this section has not been set aside in any post conviction
proceeding.
335. Larson v. State, 301 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
336. 297 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
337. 303 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
338. 290 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1974).
339. 297 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1974).
340. Gibbs v. Wainwright, 302 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974). FLA. STAT. § 947.21 (1973)
was amended by Fla. Laws ch. 74-112, effective July 1, 1974, to provide that the Parole and
Probation Commission, in its discretion, may credit the violator with any time he has satis-
factorily served on parole.
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he is not entitled to credit for time on parole and he forfeits any gain
time for good conduct he might have earned.""
2. DEATH PENALTY
By far the most controversial area of criminal procedure today
involves the imposition of the death penalty. In 1972 the United
States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia34 held that the imposi-
tion and carrying out of existing death penalties constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. The Furman case was followed by an extensive series
of cases involving unexecuted death sentences, including sentences
imposed under Florida's death penalty statute. 4 ' As a result of the
Furman line of cases, the Florida Legislature enacted Florida Stat-
ute section 921.141 (1973) in an attempt to re-establish the death
penalty in Florida within the requirements of Furman. After convic-
tion for a capital offense, a separate sentencing proceeding is re-
quired. All relevant evidence concerning aggravating and mitigating
circumstances is to be considered at this hearing. The new statute
was challenged in State v. Dixon,34 and upheld as constitutional by
the Supreme Court of Florida. The court determined that the dis-
cretion in Section 921.141 is controlled by the procedural safeguards
established therein and therefore the test of Furman is met. The
court reaffirmed its decision in Dixon in Alford v. State13 and
Spinkellink v. State. " It should be noted that at the time of this
survey the United States Supreme Court is again considering the
death penalty issue.345
In In re Baker"' the Supreme Court of Florida resentenced all
persons sentenced to death after convictions for murder and rape to
life imprisonment. The rape cases, however, were remanded to their
respective circuit courts for reconsideration of the sentence. In
340. 408 U.S. 239 (1972).
341. Anderson v. Florida, 408 U.S. 938 (1972); Johnson v. Florida, 408 U.S. 939 (1972);
Thomas v. Florida, 408 U.S. 935 (1972).
342. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). See 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 723 (1974) for a detailed discussion
of State v. Dixon.
343. 307 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1975).
344. 313 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1975).
345. Fowler v. North Carolina, cert. granted, 419 U.S. 963 (1975). Although decision of
this case has been postponed, it has been restored to the calendar for reargument. 422 U.S.
1039 (1975).
346. 267 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1972).
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McDole v. Wainwright34 the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the
treatment of one of the persons affected by Baker. The court held
that it was within the trial court's discretion not to conduct a hear-
ing to reconsider the sentence.
The supreme court in Taylor v. State34 considered the portion
of section 921.141 which affords a trial court the discretion to disre-
gard the jury's recommendation after the sentencing proceeding:
Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury,
the court after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but
if the court imposes the sentence of death, it shall set forth in
writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based
The defendant was tried by jury and found guilty of murder in the
first degree. At the sentencing hearing no additional evidence was
given, either showing aggravation or mitigation. The jury returned
a recommendation of mercy. Immediately, the trial judge imposed
a sentence of death in the electric chair. The supreme court reversed
the death sentence and directed that a sentence of life imprison-
ment be imposed. The court felt that the immediate rejection of the
jury's recommendation was contrary to the intent of the statute. In
reviewing the record, the supreme court found sufficient mitigating
factors to support the jury's recommendation. It is submitted that
this decision illustrates how precarious the "controlled discretion"
is under the new Florida statute.
In a situation where a defendant pleads guilty to a crime pun-
ishable under section 921.141, that defendant has a right to a sent-
encing hearing. In Lamadline v. State49 defendant pled guilty to
first degree murder and the court determined that the plea was
intelligently and voluntarily entered. However, the record was silent
as to whether defendant was advised of his right to have a jury
render an advisory opinion concerning the sentence. The supreme
court held that this right was essential, and while it could be
waived, such waiver could not be presumed. The case was remanded
with instructions to impanel a sentencing jury unless the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived that right.
347. 293 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1974).
348. 294 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1974).
349. 303 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1974).
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C. Appeals
1. GENERALLY
The Supreme Court of Florida has consistently held that a
question of sufficiency of the evidence is not reviewable by direct
appeal unless the issue was presented to the trial court by means of
proper motions2' Florida Appellate Rule 6.16, which allows the
court in its discretion to review anything said or done in the cause
which appears in the record on appeal, has been construed to require
this. In Chester v. State' the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, similarly held that the question of inadequate representa-
tion could not properly be raised for the first time on direct appeal.
In State v. Barber352 these issues were both present. Defendants were
convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand
larceny. On appeal they attempted to raise the issue of insufficiency
of the evidence as to the value of the property involved in the lar-
ceny. Since this question was not preserved at trial by their
attorney, the defendants raised the issue of insufficiency of the inef-
fective assistance of counsel. The District Court of Appeal, First
District, had decided that the best interests of justice required an
interpretation of Florida Appellate Rule 6.16 contrary to the su-
preme court's construction.353 As the court so aptly stated: "The
defendants-appellants find themselves in a maze of the Rules of
Procedure and construction thereof by case law, and in a quandary
as to how to reach the appellate level with reviewable points of
appeal without violating the rules and decisions mentioned. .... ,,.31
Under the discretionary provision of Florida Appellate Rule 6.16,
the court reviewed the evidence and reversed the trial court.
On conflict certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Barber found the actions of the appellate court to be erroneous and
reaffirmed its prior position on these questions. 355 The court did
point out that the defendants were entitled to review on the point
of inadequate representation, but not by direct appellate review.
The proper procedure to raise such an issue was collateral attack
350. Mancini v. State, 273 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1973); State v. Owens, 233 So. 2d 389 (Fla.
1970); State v. Wright, 224 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1969).
351. 276 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
352. 301 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1974).
353. Barber v. State, 286 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
354. 286 So. 2d at 26.
355. 301 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1974).
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through the post-conviction proceedings prescribed by Rule 3.850 of
the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Confusion over Rule 3.850
relief and appellate review also arose in Paige v. State.,' Defendant,
in proper persona, appealed his conviction but the court affirmed.
Subsequently, defendant filed a motion to vacate which was denied
by the circuit court. On appeal of this denial, the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, held that the issues that were or could have
been raised in a direct appeal are inappropriate issues for 3.850
relief.
2. "HOLLINGSHEAD APPEALS"
Florida Appellate Rule 6.2 prescribes a 30-day mandatory limit
on taking an appeal from a final judgment or order. The United
States Supreme Court decided in Douglas v. California"7 that an
indigent defendant was constitutionally guaranteed the right to
state-appointed counsel for a direct appeal. In view of the Douglas
decision, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the time limit of
30 days will not bar an appeal if the delay was the result of state
action. This view was first promulgated in Hollingshead v.
Wainwright."' The remedy afforded the aggrieved defendant is by
way of habeas corpus relief, and is frequently referred to as a "Holl-
ingshead Appeal". The supreme court developed a two-pronged test
in Baggett v. Wainwright:"9 first, whether the defendant made his
indigency and desire to appeal known to the court; and second,
whether the facts showed a deprivation of guaranteed rights by state
action.
During this survey period several cases dealt with "Hollings-
head Appeals". In Pinkins v. Wainwright,"" the defendant repre-
sented himself and pled guilty. The trial judge failed to inform the
defendant of his right to appeal. The court, by applying the princi-
ples of Baggett, held that the defendant was entitled to a delayed
appeal and appointed counsel for him. On a cautionary note the
court stated that appeal would be heard only if it was not frivolous
and if the matter could be reached on direct appeal rather than
through petition for post conviction relief under Rule 3.850. The
356. 282 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973). See notes 346-47 supra.
357. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
358. 194 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1967).
359. 229 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1969).
360. 283 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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District Court of Appeal, First District, allowed a belated appeal in
Riley v. State"' where the defendant had requested within 30 days
that his court-appointed attorney file an appeal. The attorney, how-
ever, failed to move for an order appointing the public defender
until 41 days had elapsed. The court held that the defendant's right
to appeal was frustrated by state action. In Pickett v. State,36 the
same court granted a delayed appeal going beyond the guidelines set
in Baggett. In Pickett, while defendant had not made known his
wish to appeal to a state functionary, the trial court's order ad-
judged the defendant insolvent for the purposes of appeal and ob-
taining a transcript. The District Court of Appeal, First District,
reasoned that the tone of this order might easily have misled the
criminal defendant into believing that nothing further was required
of him to perfect his appeal, and was therefore entitled to full appel-
late review. However, failure of the defendant to request an appeal
until the 30th day constitutes grounds for dismissing a petition for
a "Hollinghead Appeal. '363
An unusual question relating to timing of appeals, unrelated to
the Hollingshead issue, was presented in State ex rel. Shevin v.
Mann.3 14 Defendant tendered a plea of nolo contendre, preserving
the right to appeal the denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress.
When the trial judge refused his plea, he tendered a plea of guilty
asking to preserve for review the denial of his first plea. Although
he had pled guilty and never had a trial, defendant filed a motion
for a new trial, and subsequent to denial of this motion filed notice
of appeal. The State contended the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, did not have jurisdiction since the time for appeal
had passed. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the motion for
a new trial was proper within Florida Appellate Rule 1.3, and thus
delayed the time within which an appeal must be commenced. The
court stated a defendant should not be penalized when a permissible
post trial motion is filed, even where the motion is without merit or
even frivolous.
A practice has developed, supported by a decision of the United
361. 298 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
362. 303 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
363. Haines v. State, 297 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974). In Pickett the tone of the judges
order led defendant to believe he had no further right to appeal. In the instant case the delay
was due solely to defendant's failure to appeal in a timely manner.
364. 290 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974).
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States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit," ' of allowing a defen-
dant who has received an adverse pre-trial ruling to plead nolo
contendere and specifically preserve an objection to the ruling.
Since the trial court has discretion whether to accept such a plea,
any conditional plea with specific reservation should be made ex-
plicit. Such was the holding of Jackson v. State6' where the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, clarified its prior position regard-
ing appeals from pleas.
We hold that if a defendant pleading nolo contendere desires to
appeal from pre-trial rulings, he must make specific reservation
of that intention. The trial court and all concerned must under-
stand and agree upon the record that the plea is conditional upon
the appeal and its outcome." 7
Similarly, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, found
that a defendant had not failed to reserve the right to appeal where
the defendant had informed the court of his intention to appeal and
asked to be declared indigent for the purposes of the appeal."'
3. TRANSCRIPTS
While the due process and equal protection clauses of the
United States Constitution require that indigents be furnished tran-
scripts for purposes of a criminal appeal,369 the issue still arises as
to when the defendant is entitled to have the transcript prepared
at the public's expense. In Moore v. State,7 0 defendants filed a
timely notice of appeal, and the cases were assigned to a public
defender. As a routine matter the attorney filed directions with the
clerk to prepare the record on appeal and moved that the trial court
direct the court reporter to transcribe notes of all the proceedings.
The trial court denied the motion for the reason that the requested
transcripts were not within the scope of any assignment of error. The
District Court of Appeal, First District, affirmed the trial court's
365. U.S. v. Caraway, 474 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1973). The court indicated that while under
normal circumstances a plea of nolo contendere is the legal equivalent of a guilty plea, when
a defendant and the trial court explicitly agree that such a plea preserves objections to the
admissibility of evidence, the appellate court has felt constrained to honor such agreements.
366. 294 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
367. Id. at 115.
368. Perry v. State, 296 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
369. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
370. 298 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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action, holding that there was no basis in the record to support the
defendant's motion because it appeared that no assignment of error
had been filed in the trial court. The court felt that the problem in
Moore could largely be avoided if criminal courts adopted an ad-
ministrative rule whereby the public defender who represented the
indigent at trial would not be relieved of his duties until he filed a
notice of appeal, if an appeal is desired, and also filed assignments
of error, directions to the clerk, and designations to the reporter. 7
In Cueni v. State37 the District Court of Appeal, First District, held
that there was no need to prepare a transcript for an indigent at
public expense when the only error raised was that the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence allowed by
law. In reaching this decision the court considered the United States
Supreme Court cases of Griffith v. Illinois"3 and Draper v.
Washington.74 In light of these decisions the court held that an
indigent is entitled to a free transcript only when such transcript is




A hearing for the revocation of probation need not meet the
strict requirements of a criminal trial. It is sufficient if evidence is
taken and the probationer has a reasonable opportunity to present
his position.373 However, while the proceedings may be informal in
nature, and are not rendered erroneous by the admission of hearsay,
a judgment of revocation may not be entered where there is no
evidence except hearsay.37
2. SENTENCE UPON REVOCATION
The question of the allowable sentence which may be imposed
upon a defendant upon revocation of probation has been one which
371. Id. at 563.
372. 303 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
373. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
374. 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
375. Washington v. State, 284 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), citing McNeely v. State,
186 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
376. White v. State, 301 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974); Turner v. State, 293 So. 2d 771
(Fla. lst Dist. 1974); Hampton v. State, 276 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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has caused the courts in Florida some difficulty in the past. It is
clear in Florida that "[p]robation is a creature of statute and the
courts are limited to the authority afforded thereby." '377 Therefore,
the problem is one of statutory interpretation. Florida Statutes sec-
tion 948.06 (1973) seems clear enough giving the judge, upon revoca-
tion of probation, authority to "impose any sentence which it might
have originally imposed before placing the probationer on proba-
tion." However, section 948.01(4) which authorizes split sentences
(both incarceration and probation) has in the past caused some
uncertainty in the courts.37
In the recent decision of State v. Jones37 the Supreme Court of
Florida construed the 1973 version of section 948.01(4). In Jones the
defendant was convicted of three crimes for which he could have
been confined in the state prison. The trial judge, however, sent-
enced the defendant to 1 year in the county jail followed by 5-years
probation on each count to be served concurrently. Later the judge
reconsidered the sentences and reduced the jail time to 85 days, but
retained the 5-year period of probation. Subsequently the defend-
ant violated his probation and was sentenced to three concurrent
sentences of 2 years in the state prison.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, re-
versed the sentence, and restricted the maximum punishment to the
remainder of the previously imposed 1-year jail sentences.3"" The
court, however, certified the question of whether, under these cir-
377. Brown v. State, 302 So. 2d 430, 431 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
378. FLA. STAT. § 948.01 (4) states:
Whenever punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed, the
court, in its discretion, may at the time of sentencing direct the defendant to be
placed on probation upon completion of any specified period of such sentence. In
such case, the court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of
the sentence imposed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be
placed upon probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court.
This section was amended by the legislature in 1974. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) (Supp. 1974)
states:
Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony, except
for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion may, at the time of
sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation upon completion of
any specified period of such sentence. In such case, the court shall stay and
withhold the imposition of the remainder of such sentence imposed upon the
defendant, and direct the defendant be placed upon probation after serving such
period as may be imposed by the court.
379. 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976).
380. Jones v. State, 296 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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cumstances, the trial court upon revocation was limited to imposing
the unserved portion of the jail sentences or whether the court could
have imposed any sentence it could have imposed originally under
section 948.06.
The Supreme Court of Florida, noting various constructions
given to the probation statute by the District Courts of Appeal,
quashed the decision of the Third District and remanded with in-
structions to reinstate the sentences of the trial court, holding that
the trial court upon revocation was authorized to impose any sent-
ence it originally might have imposed. 8' The supreme court rejected
the lower court's interpretation of section 948.01(4), which would
have required the trial court to impose the total sentence at the
original sentence hearing and to withhold a part thereof for use in
the event probation was violated. The court stated the lower court's
construction conflicted with section 948.06 and apparently opted for
giving trial judges greater freedom in sentencing upon revocation for
probation. Judge Boyd dissented, stating that the court had given
an interpretation to the statute which was never contemplated by
the legislature.
381. The court also held that a trial court may place a defendant on probation and
include as a condition a period of incarceration within the maximum sentence allowed, and
that upon revocation the defendant must be given credit for any period of time spent in jail
pursuant to a split sentence probation order.
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